University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Faculty Law Review Articles

Faculty Publications

2021

Incorporation By Any Other Name? Comparing Congress'
Federalization of Tribal Court Criminal Procedure with The
Supreme Court's Regulation of State Courts
Jordan Gross
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, jordan.gross@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_lawreviews
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Gross, Jordan, "Incorporation By Any Other Name? Comparing Congress' Federalization of Tribal Court
Criminal Procedure with The Supreme Court's Regulation of State Courts" (2021). Faculty Law Review
Articles. 198.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/faculty_lawreviews/198

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Law Review Articles by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

INCORPORATION BY ANY OTHER NAME?
COMPARING CONGRESS’ FEDERALIZATION OF TRIBAL
COURT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH THE SUPREME COURT’S
REGULATION OF STATE COURTS
Jordan Gross*
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ 299
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 300
I. COLONIALIST CONTAINMENT OF INDIGENOUS JUSTICE ..................................... 304
A. Destabilized Sovereignty ........................................................................... 304
B. Imported Justice ........................................................................................ 306
C. Appropriated Jurisdiction ......................................................................... 309
II. STATE AND TRIBAL COURT PROCEDURAL REFORM
BY FEDERAL FIAT ............................................................................................. 322
A. The Supreme Court Federalizes State Court Criminal Procedure ............ 322
B. Congress Federalizes Tribal Court Criminal Procedure .......................... 328
C. An Illusory Procedural Parity ................................................................... 333
i. Appointed Counsel ............................................................................... 335
ii. Law-Licensed Judges............................................................................ 337
iii. Jury Entitlement, Jury Size, Jury Waiver ........................................... 339
iv. Proportionality in Sentencing ............................................................. 343
v. Habeas Corpus ..................................................................................... 345
III. A FALSE AND FAILED ANALOGY .................................................................... 348
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 357

*

Professor of Law, University of Montana Blewett School of Law.

299

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813968

300

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 109

INTRODUCTION
The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, governs a wide range of government conduct.
It prohibits specific government actions and grants affirmative rights to individuals.
In the criminal arena, these provisions operate in two distinct spaces. First, the
investigative phase, before a person is charged with a crime. And, second, the
adjudicative phase, after a crime is charged and court procedures are triggered. This
Article concerns the law governing the adjudicative stage of the criminal justice
process and it examines provisions of the Bill of Rights triggered by criminal charges
and their statutory analogs in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.2 These provisions
include prohibitions against subjecting an accused to double jeopardy,
self-incrimination, excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishment, and the affirmative rights to a speedy and public trial, notice of charges,
confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process, and the assistance of counsel.
The authority to define, prosecute, and punish crimes in the United States has
historically been the purview of local and state governments, not the national
government. The Bill of Rights, as enacted, only constrained the national
government prosecuting crimes in its own courts; it did not apply to the states. The
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868 following the Civil War, redefined the
relationship of the states to the national government and created an opening for
federal oversight of states’ criminal justice systems. The Fourteenth Amendment,
among other things, prohibits any state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or denying any person the equal protection of
the laws.3 The Supreme Court initially interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to
allow states to diverge from what the Bill of Rights required from the national
government in federal court prosecutions as long as states provided some basic level
of fairness to the accused.4 Today, however, the contours of state court criminal
procedure are defined, for the most by the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights requirements were extended to the states by the Supreme
Court’s “incorporation” jurisprudence.5 Under incorporation jurisdiction, if the
Court determines that a specific provision in the Bill of Rights is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,6 it is deemed “incorporated” into the Fourteenth
Amendment. As such, it binds the states on the same terms as the national
government. The Court decided its first incorporation cases in the 1920s, and they
mostly concerned the First Amendment.7 The Court did not incorporate any criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights until the 1960s.8 Thus, at the founding,
criminal procedure in state and local courts was unregulated by the U.S. Constitution;
from 1791 to the 1960s, it was supervised by the Court under a relatively deferential
2

25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875).
5
Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutional Law and
Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 70 (1996).
6
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
7
See infra note 160.
8
See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
3
4
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due process standard; since the 1960s the Court has incorporated virtually all of the
criminal procedural protections of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a result, the process by which state and local governments prosecute and punish
crimes today must adhere to a national, common law code of criminal procedure that
sets a uniform “floor” of federal protection for all defendants tried in state or federal
court.
At the founding, Indian nations exercised sovereign authority within the
territories they controlled, including the power to define and punish wrongdoing. No
Indian nation signed the U.S. Constitution. Thus, in contrast to the national
government’s relationship with the states, its relationship with individual tribal
nations is extra-constitutional. Shortly after the U.S. Constitution was ratified, the
newly-formed Congress laid claim to federal jurisdiction over wrongdoing
committed by non-Indians in some Indian territories, to the exclusion of states.
Congress later asserted federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes committed in what
has been designated “Indian country.”9 The Court subsequently carved out an
exception to federal jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country for crimes
committed by non-Indians against other non-Indians. Those case, it held, fall within
state jurisdiction. After the Court recognized tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed by one Indian against another, Congress asserted federal
jurisdiction over serious crimes of personal violence committed by Indians in Indian
country. Congress subsequently transferred federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes
in some Indian country jurisdictions to states. The Supreme Court waded into these
murky jurisdictional waters in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe in 1978.10 There
it held that tribes’ criminal jurisdiction was limited to crimes committed by Indians,
and that it did not extend to non-Indians absent express Congressional
authorization.11 After Oliphant, jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
in Indian country, which was previously exercised by tribes, rested with the states or
the federal government unless Congress said otherwise. As a result of these federal
interventions, criminal jurisdiction in Indian country today is allocated among states,
tribes, and the federal government based on whether a perpetrator or victim is an
Indian or a non-Indian, the nature of the offense, and the status under federal law of
the Indian country in which a crime occurs.
Deep issues in federal Indian law include the nature of tribes’ sovereign authority
vis-à-vis the national and state governments, the extent to which a tribe’s exercise of
authority relies on express Congressional authorization, and whether a tribe’s
9
18 U.S.C. § 1151 is the primary federal law defining “Indian Country.” It identifies three types of
Indian Country:

(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.

18 U.S.C. § 1151.
10
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
11
Id. at 208.
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jurisdiction over conduct occurring within its territory, or affecting its interests, is
concurrent with that of the other two sovereigns. Since the 1960s, Congress’ stated
policy has been to support tribes’ self-determination. One way it has expressed this
policy is by promoting and encouraging the development of Anglo-European court
systems in Indian country. Since the U.S. Constitution has no force in Indian country,
criminal procedure in tribal courts is not constrained by the Bill of Rights or the
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment incorporation jurisprudence. Tribal court criminal
procedure is nonetheless heavily regulated by Congress through the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).12 Congress enacted ICRA during the Civil Rights era
against the backdrop of the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence, and its original
version imposed most, but not all, of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of
Rights on tribal governments using language mirroring the U.S. Constitution. ICRA
also limited tribes’ sentencing authority to misdemeanor-level penalties, even for the
most serious offenses—specifically, the 1968 version of ICRA limited tribal court
sentences to six months; a cap Congress raised to one year in 1986.13
American-Indian and Alaska Native women are victimized at a rate more than
twice that of women of other ethnicities.14 This violence occurs primarily at the hands
of non-Indians, who make up a substantial majority of the residents of Indian
country. Jurisdictional loopholes that allow non-Indians to escape prosecution,
limited tribal punishment authority, and inadequate federal funding of law
enforcement and courts in Indian country have all contributed to this public safety
crisis. In response to criticism of the federal government’s law enforcement efforts
in Indian country and inadequate funding of tribal institutions on the front line of this
crisis, Congress amended ICRA with the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
(TLOA)15 and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA
2013),16 to increase tribal authority over criminal conduct in Indian country. TLOA
authorized lifting ICRA’s sentencing cap from one to three years for some offenses,
and stacking offenses for a total of up to nine years. 17 VAWA 2013 authorized tribes
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over some non-Indians for the first time since the
Court decided Oliphant over twenty-five years earlier.18
Unlike the Bill of Rights or ICRA, ICRA’s TLOA and VAWA 2013 provisions
do not create uniform procedures. Rather, they are “opt in” statutes that authorize
individual tribes to exercise greater authority over wrongdoing in their communities
if they provide additional procedural safeguards above those required under ICRA’s
1968 baselineprovisions, which set the default requirements for tribal courts. Tribes
that choose not to, or who cannot afford to adopt the more demanding procedural
requirements of TLOA and VAWA 2013 remain subject only to the baseline
12

Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
Id. § 202(7), 82 Stat. at 77; Anti-Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 4217, § 202(a)(7),
100 Stat. 3207, 3207-146.
14
André B. Rosay, Violence Against American Indian and Alaska Native Women and Men, NAT’L INST.
JUST. J., Sept. 2016, at 1, 4, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249822.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCY9-8YU5].
15
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 221, §401(a), 124 Stat. 2258, 2271.
16
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, § 204, 127
Stat. 54, 120–23.
17
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(D).
18
See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
13
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provisions of the 1968 version of ICRA. TLOA and VAWA 2013 purport to capture
criminal procedural protections required in state and federal courts under the Bill of
Rights that were either left out of the 1968 version of ICRA, or that had been added
to the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment incorporation catalog after 1968. In several
instances, Congress linked TLOA and VAWA 2013’s requirements directly to the
Court’s incorporation jurisprudence, promoting further conformity between tribal
court criminal procedure and federal constitutional criminal procedure. In many
instances, however, TLOA and VAWA 2013 require tribes to extend greater
procedural protections to defendants in their courts, especially if they are non-Indian,
than those required of states under the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. TLOA and VAWA 2013, therefore, do not simply harmonize tribal
criminal court procedure with federal constitutional criminal procedure, in some
instances they impose greater burdens on tribes seeking to exercise sovereign
authority over wrongdoing in their communities.
This Article examines the different experience of states and tribes with uniform
national standards of criminal procedure imposed by the federal government. Part I
describes the federal government’s displacement of indigenous justice in service of
colonialist political goals, a policy that has contributed to the public safety crisis in
Indian country today. Part II explains the constitutional criminal procedure
jurisprudence the Court developed for states on which Congress has modeled
ICRA’s criminal procedure provisions. In TLOA and VAWA 2013, Congress
recognized that restoring tribal autonomy over wrongdoing in Indian country must
be part of the federal policy response to the violence indigenous peoples experience
in Indian country within the United States. Part III asks whether Congress’ efforts to
further federalize tribal court criminal procedure is aligned with its stated
commitment to support tribal self-determination and make Indian country safer. This
Article asserts that requiring tribes to adopt even more trappings of Anglo-European
justice norms as the exclusive means to access increased authority over wrongdoing
in their communities is counterproductive to Congress’ stated goals in two ways.
First, it constrains tribes’ ability to adapt their court practices and processes to reflect
their individual community’s normative values. This can undermine tribal courts’
internal legitimacy and, ultimately, their effectiveness. Second, Congress’ approach
puts residents in low-resource and rural tribal communities at even greater risk of
harm. Some of the additional procedures TLOA and VAWA 2013 require tribes to
adopt as a pre-condition to exercising increased authority are extremely costly to
implement. Thus, the promise of increased authority and restored sovereignty
Congress has held out can only be accessed by tribes that have adequate revenue
sources to pay for them, that are willing to re-direct funds from other public services
to fund TLOA and VAWA 2013 upgrades, or that are situated near urban areas where
they can access additional human and institutional resources in neighboring
communities. This leaves low-resource, rural tribal communities in an Oliphant
world, a world in which all crimes within the tribe’s jurisdiction, no matter how
serious, are treated as misdemeanors, and where non-Indians can victimize residents
of Indian country with relative impunity.
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I. COLONIALIST CONTAINMENT OF INDIGENOUS JUSTICE
A. Destabilized Sovereignty
“Sovereignty” is typically understood to encompass a community’s power to
make decisions in a given geographic region to the exclusion of all other earthly
authorities.19 Tribal nations situated within the present-day United States were
initially acknowledged as sovereign entities whose relationship with the
newly-established United States was defined by treaties and governed by
international law principles.20 This was not unlike the original colonial states, which
enjoyed sovereign status until they agreed to form a federal union. 21 Tribal nations,
however, were not parties to the U.S. Constitution, 22 and they have had a different
experience from states in exercising their sovereignty vis-à-vis the national
government. Depending on the historical reference point, federal Indian policy has

19
“Sovereignty” is a complex term with multiple meanings and implications. One privilege
commonly associated with sovereignty is establishing norms of behavior within a geographic area, and
defining the process by which deviations from norms are vindicated. Among other things, it encompasses
a community’s power to make decisions for itself. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and
Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 834–36 (2006); Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic
Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 1, 6–7
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (identifying four common uses of the term “sovereignty”—domestic
sovereignty, to refer to public authority within a state and power to exert effective control;
interdependence sovereignty, to refer to control of cross-border movements; international legal
sovereignty, to refer to legal recognition of nation-states; and Westphalian sovereignty, to refer to power
to exclude external actors from internal affairs).
20
Colonial and early federal law treated the relationship between settlers and tribal nations as one
between sovereigns governed by international law principles. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 140–41 (1962); Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical
Analysis of the 1968 ‘Indian Civil Rights’ Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 558–59 (1972). Consistent with
the status of Indian nations as external sovereigns (and external threats) under international law, Congress
assigned responsibility for Indian affairs to the War Department in 1786, shortly after the United States
was founded. Burnett, supra, at 558.
21
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493 (2019) (“After independence, the States
considered themselves fully sovereign nations. . . . Under international law, then, independence ‘entitled’
the Colonies ‘to all the rights and powers of sovereign states.’” (first quoting THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S. 1776); and then quoting McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209,
212 (1808))).
22
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383–84 (1896) (because Indian tribes predated the U.S. Constitution
and did not derive their authority from it, they were not subject to the constitutional limitations of the Fifth
Amendment); see also United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 777 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated by Texas
v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (“Talton was decided decades before most of the protections of the Bill of
Rights were held to be binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . Nonetheless, Talton
has come to stand for the proposition that neither the Bill of Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment
operates to constrain the governmental actions of Indian tribes.’” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)) (citations omitted)); Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian
Law and Tribal Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 428 (2014)
(“Since Indian tribes ‘did not participate in the Constitutional Convention and did not “sign on” by joining
the federal union,’ they are not bound by the Constitution, absent affirmative congressional action to the
contrary.”).
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reflected hubristic laissez-faire sensibilities,23 on one extreme, and ethnocidal24
micro-management, on the other.25
Under modern federal law, tribal nations in the United States are domestic
sovereigns who, like states, retain significant autonomy within their boundaries, but
whose sovereign authority yields to that of the national government.26 The sovereign
authority of tribal nations is “acknowledged under federal law to be aboriginal[,]”
that is, it “does not derive from the Constitution, is not necessarily constrained by
the Constitution, and predates the Constitution.” 27 Tribal sovereignty is “enshrined”
in federal law.28 But “tribal sovereignty is not a delegation of federal authority.
Rather, federal law recognizes the aboriginal authority of tribes to
self-government.”29 Unlike the states, whose relationship with the national
government was framed by the U.S. Constitution and refined by the Tenth
Amendment,30 the federal government’s relationship with tribal nations is defined
by treaties and a trust obligation.31

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (recognizing reservation tribes’ authority “to make their
own laws and be ruled by them”).
24
Ethnocide (also referred to as cultural genocide), describes “the purposeful weakening and ultimate
destruction of cultural values and practices of feared out-groups.” Lindsey Kingston, The Destruction of
Identity: Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 63, 63–64 (2015) (citation omitted)
(“Within North America and around the world, indigenous nations continue to face systemic, widespread
threats to their fundamental human rights to culture. These identity groups are increasingly
conceptualizing such rights violations as ‘cultural genocide’ . . . .”).
25
Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 307,
311–12 (“The United States has approached tribal sovereignty through an inconsistent and opportunistic
lens. It is a complex and curious legacy. . . . The United States has wrestled with how to regard and
reconcile coexisting sovereigns within the territory of the United States. The Removal Act purported to
induce tribal cooperation to relocate west of the Mississippi River but resulted in the forcible removal and
relocation of tribal communities. The General Allotment Act, sanctioned a policy of forced assimilation
and effected a catastrophic loss of Indian homelands and territory. The Indian Reorganization Act,
proposing a policy of greater self-government was soon followed by the Termination Era, undertaking to
terminate the federal-tribal relationship with numerous tribes. Currently, the United States endorses a
policy of tribal self-determination, recognizing tribal sovereignty and the right of tribal self-government.”
(citations omitted)).
26
Id. at 309 (“Underlying many of these legal fights [about the extent of tribal authority] is confusion
about the nature of tribal sovereignty. Under current federal law, tribes are not international or Westphalian
sovereigns, with the power to exercise traditional external sovereignty. Rather, tribes are domestic sovereigns,
retaining significant powers but subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the United States.”).
27
Id. at 313–14 (citations omitted).
28
Id. at 314.
29
Id. (citations omitted).
30
The Tenth Amendment, ratified in 1791 as part of the first ten amendments that form the Bill of
Rights, reads: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
31
Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal Indian Policy,
130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200, 201 (2017) (“[T]he [federal] political branches have come to view the content
of the [federal government’s] trust responsibility [towards tribes] differently. The obligations under the
federal trust responsibility have evolved from a paternalistic model in which the federal government
provides services and programs and makes decisions for impoverished Native Americans, to an
understanding that the trust responsibility obliges the federal government to support and revitalize tribal
governments and even advocate and protect tribal sovereign powers.”).
23
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B. Imported Justice
Today, many tribes look to traditional sources of law to inform their individual
community’s justice processes, procedurally and structurally. Nonetheless, many
tribal justice systems have come to resemble the colonialist justice systems of the
state and federal governments.32 The assimilation of tribal justice structures and
procedures is due, in large measure, to external federal statutory mandates, and
incentives and disincentives that have either forced or encouraged tribal justice to
conform to a colonialist model.33 By way of example, in 1883, at the behest of the
Office of Indian Affairs (now the Bureau of Indian Affairs), the Department of the
Interior adopted Law and Order Codes for Indian country. 34 The Law and Order
Codes were the precursor to the Code of Indian Offenses.35 These Codes were
federal regulations that regulated, and sometimes criminalized indigenous cultural
practices.36 These provisions of the Code of Indian Offenses were not removed until
32
Melody L. McCoy, Tribal Courts: Forums for the Future, NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND (NARF) LEGAL
REV., Fall 1987, at 1, 2 (“[T]oday’s tribal courts tend to look and act much like the non-Indian courts of
states, counties and municipalities. This is not surprising. Many similarities are the result of federal Indian
policies which for so long have suppressed tribal self-determination.”).
33
Professor Matthew Fletcher explains that the backdrop against which tribal governments have
developed includes the federal government’s failure to honor its treaty obligations and a morphing of the
understanding of the federal government’s treaty obligations:

The original understanding of the federal-tribal relationship was that the United States
agreed to undertake a duty of protection to Indians and tribes. This means that the tribes gave
up much of their exterior sovereignty, but they were to retain all the internal governmental
powers they possess, like the power to make laws and enforce them within the tribe’s territory.
. . . The United States also agreed to manage and protect Indian tribes’ resources, such as
lands and timber.
However, the duty of protection mutated politically into a guardian-ward relationship . . .
. It would also be the premise for the federal government to label Indian people legally
incompetent. This way of thinking reached an apex in the 1880s when Congress federalized
jurisdiction in Indian Country, broke up reservations into individual allotments, and made
boarding school education mandatory.

Rory Taylor, 6 Native Leaders on what it would look like if the US kept its promises, VOX (Sept. 23,
2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/2019/9/23/20872713/native-american-indian-treaties
(last accessed Jan. 14, 2021).
34
Robert N. Clinton, Code of Indian Offenses, OFF. OF ROBERT N. CLINTON, http://robertclinton.com/?page_id=289 [https://perma.cc/YMH7-C5FZ]. The Office of Indian Affairs was initially
housed in the U.S. Department of War, which oversaw the U.S. military. In 1849, Congress moved the
Office of Indian Affairs from the War Department to the Department of Interior, which is tasked with
managing public lands. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, INDIAN AFFS.,
https://www.bia.gov/bia [https://perma.cc/T7B6-3K6L].
35
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal Law, 2
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 100 (2007).
36
The federal Courts of Indian Offenses prosecuted Indians for things like participating in ceremonies
in an effort to criminalize and displace tribal spiritual traditions in favor of Christian traditions. Letter
from the Hon. Hiram Price, Comm’r of Indian Affs., to the Emps. of the Dep’t of the Interior, Off. of
Indian Affs. (Mar. 30, 1883), http://robert-clinton.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/code-of-indianoffenses.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP66-Y6DL] (discussing the original Code of Indian Offenses). Professor
Robert Clinton cautions the Code of Indian Offenses should not be confused with a criminal code as that
term is commonly understood, but rather as an instrument of “federal ethnocide.” As he explains, when
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1933.37 Courts of Indian Offenses, often referred to as “CFR Courts” were created to
enforce the Code.38 At their apex, CFR Courts exercised jurisdiction over
approximately two-thirds of the Indian reservations within the United States. 39 A
handful of CFR Courts remain in operation today.40
When Congress enacted the Code of Indian Offenses, it applied to Indians in
Indian territories, except the territory occupied by the Five “Civilized” Tribes.41 The
Five Tribes, the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole Indians,
occupied the Indian Territory, a region roughly corresponding to the modern-day
state of Oklahoma.42 These tribes were referred to as “civilized” because they were
considered by the federal government to be sufficiently assimilated as not to require
federal regulatory control.43 In 1889, Congress created a separate U.S. Court for the
Indian Territory occupied by the Five Tribes.44 This court had original jurisdiction
the Code was promulgated, “most of the nomadic plains tribes had been corralled onto reservations” and
the bison had been decimated by “federally-sponsored eradication” programs; this made tribal members,
completely dependent on federal rations . . . . In this context, the penalty prescribed by the
Code of Indian Offenses for practicing traditional and customary ways often involved the
denial of rations. Thus, the federal government’s message to tribal Indians in the late nineteenth
century was crystal clear—abandon your traditional culture and comply with the Code of
Indian Offenses or starve.

Clinton, supra note 34.
37
Clinton, supra note 34.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2019). These courts are located in Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma,
and Utah. Id. A list of Indian country courts, including C.F.R. Courts, can be found at: Tribal
Courts, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm#CFR%20Courts
[https://perma.cc/AKK9-ZQJJ].
41
Five Civilized Tribes, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/FiveCivilized-Tribes [https://perma.cc/AQ5X-SP4V] (“Five Civilized Tribes . . . has been used officially and
unofficially since at least 1866 to designate the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole
Indians in Oklahoma (former Indian Territory) . . . . The word civilized was applied to the five tribes
because, broadly speaking, they had developed extensive economic ties with whites or had assimilated
into American settler culture. Some members of these southeastern tribes had adopted European clothing,
spoke English, practiced Christianity, and even owned slaves.”).
42
Brad A. Bays, Indian Territory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT PLAINS (David J. Wishart ed.,
2011), http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.na.050#egp.na.050 [https://perma.cc/64TVW8ND] (“All of Oklahoma was referred to as ‘Indian Territory’ until 1890, when Congress partitioned
Oklahoma Territory and made ‘Indian Territory’ the formal name for the Five Civilized Tribes’ domain.
Indian Territory’s relevance to the Great Plains thus spans from the 1820s, when the United States cleared
title through treaty cessions by the Quapaws (1818) and Osages (1825) and designated the area as ‘Indian
Country,’ to the Oklahoma land runs, beginning in 1889.”). The Court recently held that treaty cessions
the federal government purportedly obtained in the Indian Territory invalid in McGirt v. Oklahoma, No.
18-9526, slip op. at 1 (July 9, 2020). The result is that a significant portion of Eastern Oklahoma is Indian
country under federal law, not part of the state of Oklahoma. This makes that land subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of the Creek Nation and U.S. government, not the state of Oklahoma. Tucker Higgins & Dan
Mangan, Supreme Court says eastern half of Oklahoma is Native American land, CNBC (July 9, 2020,
2:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/09/supreme-court-says-eastern-half-of-oklahoma-is-nativeamerican-land.html [https://perma.cc/C3PU-FMYE].
43
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, supra note 41.
44
Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 333, 25 Stat. 783; U.S. Courts for the Indian Territory, 1889-1907, FED. JUD.
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/us-courts-indian-territory-1889-1907 [https://perma.cc/W9KV-C28C].
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over all criminal matters except those punishable by death or hard labor, and those
arising between “persons of Indian blood.”45 The first category of offenses—those
punishable by death or hard labor—was the purview of a federal District Court; the
latter—offenses between Indians—fell within the authority of the tribes in the Indian
territory. The U.S. Court for the Indian Territory was in operation until 1907. 46
Many contemporary tribal courts trace their origins to the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA) of 1934.47 The IRA encouraged Indian tribes to adopt constitutions,
establish justice codes, and operate court systems.48 The IRA required tribes to seek
approval from the Secretary of the Interior for many tribal government actions.49
Many tribes adopted “IRA constitutions” based on templates provided by the federal
government and subject to its approval.50 Notwithstanding its paternalistic approach,
the IRA is often regarded as a federal legislative effort to encourage and promote
tribal self-determination and self-governance.51 Contemporary federal policy
45

U.S. Courts for the Indian Territory, supra note 44.
Id.
47
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 5123).
48
Id. See Sam Thypin-Bermeo, Political Cooperation and Procedural (In)Justice: A Study of the
Indian Reorganization Act, AM. INDIAN L.J., Fall 2013, at 300, 304 (noting financial incentives and
subsidies in the IRA).
49
Richmond L. Clow, The Indian Reorganization Act and The Loss of Tribal Sovereignty:
Constitutions on the Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservations, 7 GREAT PLAINS Q. 125, 125 (1987).
50
Jane C. Hu, One woman took a stand against tribal disenrollment and paid for it, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.hcn.org/issues/52.2/indigenous-affairs-one-woman-took-a-standagainst-tribal-disenrollment-and-paid-for-it-nooksack [https://perma.cc/AMD4-MG69] (“‘[Model] IRA
constitutions’ . . . [were] circulated to some tribes by the Bureau of Indian Affairs shortly after the passage
of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, which was designed to return sovereignty and self-governance to
tribes. The prescribed constitutions were, unsurprisingly, modeled on colonial concepts of national
government: Each tribe would be a ‘nation’ responsible for determining membership, where members
would have voting powers. But the new rules didn’t reflect the lives of Indigenous people; unlike the
system the BIA recommended, Indigenous people didn’t enforce official tribal ‘membership,’ delineate
national borders, or track blood quantum before colonial intervention. IRA constitutions differ from the
U.S. Constitution in that they usually lack checks and balances between branches of government. Instead,
the tribal council holds all legislative, judicial and executive power.”); see also Developments in the Law
– Indian Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1652, 1662 (2016) (identifying that IRA constitutions concentrate
nearly all tribal governmental power into the tribal council).
51
Fletcher, supra note 35, at 99 (“Many tribal governments and tribal justice systems have never
recovered from these changes forced from outside. Congress attempted to restore a semblance of tribal
self-governance by enacting the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, but the intent and practical operation of
this reformist legislation still was to encourage Indian tribes to adopt governments and laws mirroring
Anglo-American legal structures..” (citations omitted)). Indian Nations, of course, are not the only
pre-colonial community absorbed into the U.S. political system that continues to exist under a unique and
complex arrangement, and on unequal footing with the states. The island of Puerto Rico was a Spanish
colonial possession for close to four-hundred years before Spain ceded it to the United States at the end
of Spanish-American War. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, Spain-U.S., art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755. By treaty, the U.S. Congress was assigned
the power to determine the question of the “civil rights and political status” of the people of Puerto Rico.
Id. at 1759. In 1950, Congress authorized the people of Puerto Rico to undertake constitutional
self-governance and draft a constitution. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, No. 15-108, slip op. at 2 (June 9,
2016); Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319. Public Law 600 required Puerto Rico’s
constitution to ensure a republican form of government and provide a bill of rights. Id. § 2, 64 Stat. 319.
The Puerto Rican people approved a constitution that created the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952.
J. Res. of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327.
46
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acknowledges tribal justice systems as an integral and essential feature of tribes’
sovereignty, self-determination, and cultural survival that the national government is
obligated to fund and support as part of its treaty trust responsibilities to tribal
nations.52 There are currently 574 federally-recognized tribes situated within the
United States.53 In 2002, according to a federal census, about 60% of tribes operated
some form of tribal justice system. 54
C. Appropriated Jurisdiction
Although the Constitution does not extend to Indian country, federal laws of
national applicability, such as federal drug and firearm laws, do apply in Indian
country in most circumstances.55 Federal law also includes statutes and doctrines
unique to Indian country. The primary federal laws governing criminal law and
jurisdiction in Indian country are: The Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA); 56 the

52

The Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, for example, is based on the following Congressional findings:
(1) there is a government-to-government relationship between the United States and each
Indian tribe;
(2) the United States has a trust responsibility to each tribal government that includes the
protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government;
(3) Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the exercise of administrative authorities, has
recognized the self-determination, self-reliance, and inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes;
(4) Indian tribes possess the inherent authority to establish their own form of government,
including tribal justice systems;
(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as important
forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments;
(6) Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice systems as
the appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property rights;
(7) traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the maintenance of the culture and
identity of Indian tribes and to the goals of this chapter;
(8) tribal justice systems are inadequately funded, and the lack of adequate funding
impairs their operation; and
(9) tribal government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal justice systems
is essential to the accomplishment of the goals of this chapter.

25 U.S.C. § 3601.
53
About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR; INDIAN AFF’S. https://www.bia.gov/about-us
[https://perma.cc/FE88-N465] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
54
STEVEN W. PERRY, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. iii (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctjaic02.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX6P-H4RL]; Tribal
Courts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=29
[https://perma.cc/CWU4-844D] (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
55
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he general rule is that a federal
statute of nationwide applicability that is otherwise silent on the question of jurisdiction as to Indian tribes
‘will not apply to them if: (1) the law touches “exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters”; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would “abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties”;
or (3) there is proof “by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to
apply to Indians on their reservations . . . .”’”) (quoting Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d
1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2004); 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.5 (3d ed. 2019).
56
Indian Country Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1152, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (1948) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152). ICCA is also known as the Interracial Crime Provision of the General
Crimes Act. CONF. OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 4:8 (2020).
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Indian Major Crimes Act (MCA);57 Public Law 280;58 the “Duro Fix” statute,59 (so
named because it overturned the Court’s 1990 Duro v. Reina60 opinion); and the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968, as amended by the Tribal Law and Order
Act (TLOA) of 201061 and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act
(VAWA) of 2013.62 These statutes, along with Supreme Court opinions, have created
what is often referred to as a “jurisdictional maze” in Indian country. 63 As explained
below, federal law in this area earned this moniker because it apportions criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country among the three sovereigns based on the
Indian/non-Indian status of the defendant and victim, the type of crime committed,
and whether the Indian country where the crime is committed is a “Public Law 280
jurisdiction” or a “Major Crimes Act jurisdiction.”
One of Congress’ first orders of business after the founding was to assert federal
control over settlers’ interactions with tribal communities, to the exclusion of the
states, and to allocate jurisdiction over wrongdoing in tribal communities between
the federal government and individual tribes. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1790 was one of Congress’ first laws. 64 It established a federal framework that
distinguishes between Indians and non-Indians in determining whether wrongdoing
committed in lands controlled by a tribe would be judged according to colonialist or
indigenous processes and norms.65 Under the Act, Congress asserted sole treatymaking authority to regulate interactions between Indians and non-Indians in the
United States and its territories.66 This included the power to prosecute and punish
non-Indians who engaged in wrongdoing against “friendly” Indians in Indian
territories.67 Under the Act, those non-Indians were to be prosecuted in a federal
court and according to settler procedures. 68 The federal government’s assertion of
57

Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360). Congress enacted Public Law 83-280 (also “Public Law 280” or “PL 280”) in 1953.
59
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
60
495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990).
61
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 221, § 401(a), 124 Stat. 2258, 2271.
62
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, § 204, 127
Stat. 54, 120–23 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
63
E.g., Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1977).
64
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (2018)).
65
Id. § 5.
66
Id. § 1.
67
Id. § 5.
68
Section 5 of the Act provides that conduct committed by non-Indians against “peaceable and
friendly” Indians will be deemed a crime if it would be a crime under state or federal law if committed in
a state or federal territory against a non-Indian:
58

if any citizen or inhabitant of the United States, or of either of the territorial districts of
the United States, shall go into any town, settlement or territory belonging to any nation or tribe
of Indians, and shall there commit any crime upon, or trespass against, the person or property
of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians, which, if committed within the jurisdiction of
any state, or within the jurisdiction of either of the said districts, against a citizen or white
inhabitant thereof, would be punishable by the laws of such state or district, such offender or
offenders shall be subject to the same punishment, and shall be proceeded against in the same
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authority over crimes committed by non-Indians in lands controlled by tribes is
reflected in the “Bad Men” provisions in some tribes’ treaties.69 “Bad Men”
provisions require tribes to turn over non-Indians who engaged in wrongdoing in
their territories to federal authorities.70
In 1817, Congress enacted the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA). 71 The ICCA
is contained within the General Crimes Act.72 The General Crimes Act established
federal “enclave jurisdiction” (also called the “special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States”) to extend federal law to locations in which the
federal government claims a paramount interest in having its laws enforced. 73 The
ICCA establishes federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes that would normally be
prosecuted by a local authority (such as crimes against the person), but for the fact
that they are committed in a location the national government has designated a
federal “enclave.”74 In those locations, the national government asserts the

manner as if the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of the state or district to
which he or they may belong, against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof.

Id. § 5. Section 6 of the Act provides that the procedures and location of trial would be governed by
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Congress had passed the year before and which established lower federal
courts. Id. § 6.
69
E.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and Different Tribes of Sioux Indians,
Sioux-U.S., art. 1, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter Treaty of Fort Laramie].
70
The Treaty of Fort Laramie between the United States and the Sioux Nations, opened for signature
on April 29, 1868, for example, reads:
If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation upon the person or
property of any one, white, black, or Indian, subject to the authority of the United States, and
at peace therewith, the Indians herein named solemnly agree that they will, upon proof made
to their agent and notice by him, deliver up the wrong-doer to the United States, to be tried and
punished according to its laws . . . .

Id.; see also Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 567–68 (1883) (noting that “[s]imilar provisions for
the extradition of criminals are to be found in most of the treaties with Indian tribes”); Note, A Bad Man
is Hard to Find, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2521, 2525 (2014).
71
ICCA was originally codified at ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817); it is currently codified, as amended, at
18 U.S.C. § 1152. The ICCA carried over provisions of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of the
1790s. It extends the “general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in
any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia
. . . to the Indian Country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
72
United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (tribal authority over crime in Indian
country “continued until shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, when Congress extended federal
jurisdiction to non-Indians committing crimes against Indians in Indian territory”); see also CARRIE E.
GARROW & SARA DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 86 (2004) (identifying that the ICCA,
commonly known as the General Crimes Act, extended federal court jurisdiction over crimes committed
in Indian country between Indians and non-Indians).
73
The General Crimes Act reauthorized and clarified existing federal laws pertaining to criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country and made clear that the same federal criminal jurisdiction exercised in other
federal “enclaves” also extends to Indian country. Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American
Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 737 (2008) (“[T]ribes have jurisdiction over
non-major crimes committed by an Indian against a non-Indian, as does the federal government under the
General Crimes Act, so long as the Indian defendant has not been punished by the tribe.”). The General
Crimes Act explicitly reserves tribal court jurisdiction over non-federal crimes committed in Indian
country that only involve Indians. Id. at 736.
74
18 U.S.C. § 1152.
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prerogative of exercising criminal jurisdiction over wrongdoing committed therein. 75
Federal enclaves include the territorial waters and territorial lands of the United
States, national parks and forests, and federal structures and compounds, such as
forts and military bases.76 It also includes Indian country.
Although Indian country falls under federal enclave jurisdiction generally, the
ICCA provides for three legislative exceptions to federal enclave jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country. 77 One, where the crime is committed by an
Indian against another Indian.78 Two, where a crime is committed by an Indian who
has been punished by local tribal law.79 And, three, any case in which a tribe retains
exclusive jurisdiction over an offense by treaty. 80 Thus, outside of treaty provisions,
following enactment of the ICCA, in Indian country, tribes had exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed by Indians against Indians; the federal government and tribes
had concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against non-Indians;
and the federal government had exclusive federal jurisdiction over crimes committed
by non-Indians.81 Notwithstanding the plain language of the ICCA, in 1882, the
Court created a fourth exception to federal Indian country enclave jurisdiction in
United States v. McBratney.82 There, the Court held that, absent treaty provisions to

75
Areas subject to federal enclave jurisdiction are defined in the federal criminal code at 18 U.S.C. §
7. The “laws” extended to Indian country by the ICCA are those federal laws made applicable within the
Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States by statute. Those laws are referred to as
the “federal enclave laws.” Federal enclave offenses include: arson, Id. § 81, assault, Id. § 113, maiming,
Id. § 114, theft, Id. § 661, receiving stolen property, Id. § 662, murder, Id. § 1111, manslaughter, Id. §
1112, and sexual offenses, Id. §§ 2241–44. When a crime is committed in a federal enclave, but the
conduct is not defined by federal law, another federal statute, the Assimilative Crimes Act, Id. § 13, allows
federal courts to look to state law to define crimes. This feature of federal law is extended to Indian country
by virtue of the ICCA. That means that if an act violating one of the federal enclave laws is committed in
Indian country and it is not excepted by the ICCA (i.e., it is not a crime committed by one Indian against
another Indian or previously punished by a tribe), jurisdiction lies in a federal court, not a state or tribal
court. As discussed infra, notwithstanding the ICCA, any crime committed by an Indian that is enumerated
in the Major Crimes Act is also subject to federal jurisdiction.
76
18 U.S.C. § 7(1), (3). Federal enclave jurisdiction also covers some unlikely and unexpected
locations such as islands, rocks, and keys containing guano deposits (which “may, at the discretion of the
President, be considered as appertaining to the United States”), and space vehicles in flight. Id. § 7(4), (6).
Modern enclave jurisdiction is highly relevant in the West because federal public lands occupy almost
fifty percent of the western states and Alaska. For a map of federal land in the United States, see Quoctrung
Bui & Margot Sanger-Katz, Why the Government Owns So Much Land in the West, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/upshot/why-the-government-owns-so-much-land-in-thewest.html [https://perma.cc/E74V-BYTQ] (noting that the U.S. Government owns forty-seven percent of
the land in the West).
77
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (“This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who
has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.”).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882).
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the contrary, states, not the federal government, have exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Indian country by non-Indians against other non-Indians.83
The Court confirmed this reading of the Indian-on-Indian crime exception to
federal enclave jurisdiction under the ICCA in its 1883 opinion in Ex parte Crow
Dog.84 There it held that, under the ICCA, federal courts could not exercise enclave
jurisdiction over wrongdoing committed by one Indian against another Indian in
Indian country.85 Kan-gi-Shun-ca, known in English as “Crow Dog,” was a
member of the Brulé Sioux band of the Sioux Nation of Indians. 86 He killed
Sin-ta-ge-le-Scka, known in English as “Chief Spotted Tail,” a member of his own
tribe, in the Dakota Territory.87 The incident leading to Spotted Tail’s death stemmed
from a political dispute about the extent to which Spotted Tail, who was popular
among settlers, was supporting the United States government and receiving
favoritism from it.88 This special treatment “angered and offended many of the
traditional leaders” in his community. 89 The tribe addressed Crow Dog’s conduct
according to Brulé tradition—the tribal council met, ordered the parties to put an
“end to the disturbance,” and “arranged a peaceful reconciliation” between the
affected families through a property exchange. 90 Notwithstanding the tribal
punishment, the federal government sought and obtained a grand jury indictment
charging Crow Dog for murder under federal law. 91 He was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to death in the Dakota Territorial Court, a federal tribunal. 92

83
Id.; accord Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 325 n.21 (1978); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977); Williams v. United States,
327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946); see also Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in the Legal History
of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 196–97 (1989) (“McBratney[] involved the murder of
one white man by another on the Ute Reservation in Colorado. The Court held that the state had criminal
jurisdiction over all lands within the state as an attribute of state sovereignty unless the federal government
specifically restricted that right upon statehood. This potentially threatened Indians in states that had been
admitted to the union without a specific reservation of federal authority over Indians. However, the
Supreme Court never intended that, and the case was never extended to Indians. It seemed to be prompted
by the very real threat to law and order presented by rough whites who gravitated to Indian reservations
because they were free from state authorities there. McBratney swept that away. Since the tribes did not
have jurisdiction over whites on their reservations, McBratney did not deprive Indians of any jurisdiction.
Rather, it deprived federal authorities of jurisdiction. Still, the opinion had negative consequences for the
tribes because it did give the states concurrent criminal jurisdiction over reservation lands (but not over
Indians).” (citation omitted)).
84
109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 557.
87
Id.; see also SIDNEY L. HARRING, C ROW DOG ’ S C ASE : AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY ,
TRIBAL LAW , AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE N INETEENTH C ENTURY 104–05 (1994).
88
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 94 (Bruce Elliott Johansen ed., 1998).
89
Id.
90
Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional
Imperative, 18 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 317, 336 n.118 (2013) (citing HARRING, supra note 87, at 104–05)
(“For the murder, Kan-gi-shun-ca’s family was ordered under tribal law to compensate Spotted Tail’s
family for the loss by offering ‘$600 in cash, eight horses, and one blanket’”).
91
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
92
Id.; Univ. of Alaska Fairbanks, Crow Dog Case (1883), FED. INDIAN L. ALASKA TRIBES
(Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.uaf.edu/tribal/112/unit_1/crowdogcase.php# [https://perma.cc/4LVV6LQL] (providing an oral explanation of the case with photos of Crow Dog and Spotted Tail).
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After being sentenced to death, federal authorities granted Crow Dog permission
to travel back to his community, unguarded, to attend to his affairs and ordered him
to return to be hanged.93 Some settlers in Lawrence County, the location of Crow
Dog’s federal trial, wagered that he would not return. 94 To their surprise, Crow Dog
came back, as he agreed to do.95 His return created “a sensation” among the settlers,
“who now looked at him as a paragon of honesty.”96 Among them were the attorneys
who volunteered to take up his cause and who filed the federal writ of habeas corpus
that resulted in the reversal of his conviction.97 Crow Dog’s act of honoring his word
by returning to face execution is a poignant illustration of the profound disconnect
between settler and indigenous attitudes towards accountability—Crow Dog
returned to face a lethal consequence that had been imposed on him by an outside
system, even though his family had made reparations for his conduct under his tribe’s
law. But many of the settlers, whose law had condemned Crow Dog to die, assumed
that he wouldn’t return, presumably based on an Anglo-informed assumption that
most men will seek to escape an extreme punishment like execution, even if it means
engaging in deceit or dishonesty. 98
The Dakota Territory was an enclave of the United States. Accordingly, the
federal government invoked its enclave jurisdiction to indict Crow Dog. 99 At the
time, the federal enclave laws made murder in a federal enclave punishable by
death.100 As noted, although Indian country falls under federal enclave jurisdiction,
the ICCA contains exceptions for: (1) Indian-on-Indian crimes, and (2) offenses by
Indians who have been punished by their tribe, both of which applied to Crow Dog’s
case. The issue in Crow Dog was not whether the federal court or the tribe had
jurisdiction over Indians who commit crimes in federal enclaves in the abstract, but
whether the United States’ treaty with the Sioux Nation—the Treaty of Fort
Laramie—signed after Congress enacted the ICCA, implicitly repealed or overrode
the Indian country exceptions in the ICCA, at least as to members of the Sioux
93

THE E NCYCLOPEDIA OF N ATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION , supra note 88, at 94.
Id.; Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
95
THE E NCYCLOPEDIA OF N ATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION , supra note 88, at 94.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
This assumption is reflected in modern Anglo-American bail law. The original purpose of bail was
to secure the presence of the accused at future proceedings. All of the original constitutions or early laws
of the states contained a provision providing for a categorical right to have bail set, except where the
defendant was accused of a capital offense. Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing
Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 916 (2013) (original constitutions of forty-one states contained a
“Consensus Right to Bail Clause”—a reference to bail ability by “sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great”—and eight others protected the right by
statute). The exception for capital offenses reflects an assumption, based on a Western understanding of
human nature, that there is no amount of bail that can ensure a defendant’s return if it may result in his
execution.
99
Federal law at the time provided that “[t]he district courts of the Territory of Dakota [had] the same
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the United States as [was] vested in the circuit and district
courts of the United States.” Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 559. In addition to enforcing federal law, territorial
courts also had authority to enforce local territorial law. Id. at 560.
100
Id. at 558 (citing 70 R.S. § 5339 which read “every person who commits murder . . . within any
fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall suffer death.”).
94
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Nation.101 Concluding that the Treaty of Fort Laramie did not repeal any part of the
ICCA, the Court held that the Sioux Tribe had authority to resolve the conflict, and
that the federal Territorial Court did not.102 Accordingly, the Court overturned Crow
Dog’s federal conviction.103 Crow Dog is a well-reasoned, albeit xenophobic,
application of the principles of statutory and treaty construction. 104 It is not, it should
be noted, a celebration of tribal sovereignty,105 nor does it reflect the reverence with
which the Court often describes the status of states in the United States federal
system.106

Id. at 562 (“The argument in support of the jurisdiction and conviction is, that the exception
contained in § 2146 Rev. Stat. is repealed by the operation and legal effect of the treaty with the different
tribes of the Sioux Indians of April 29th, 1868, 15 Stat. 635; and an act of Congress, approved February
28th, 1877, to ratify an agreement with certain bands of the Sioux Indians, &c. 19 Stat. 254.”); see also
id. at 570 (“It must be remembered that the question before us is whether the express letter of § 2146 of
the Revised Statutes, which excludes from the jurisdiction of the United States the case of a crime
committed in the Indian country by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, has been
repealed. If not, it is in force and applies to the present case. The treaty of 1868 and the agreement and act
of Congress of 1877, it is admitted, do not repeal it by any express words. What we have said is sufficient
at least to show that they do not work a repeal by necessary implication.”).
102
Id. at 570–72.
103
Id. at 572.
104
Id. at 571 (“The nature and circumstances of this case strongly reinforce this rule of interpretation
in its present application. It is a case involving the judgment of a court of special and limited jurisdiction,
not to be assumed without clear warrant of law. It is a case of life and death. It is a case where, against an
express exception in the law itself, that law, by argument and inference only, is sought to be extended
over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community, separated by race, by tradition, by the
instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the
restraints of an external and unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct,
according to rules and penalties of which they could have no previous warning; which judges them by a
standard made by others and not for them, which takes no account of the conditions which should except
them from its exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries them, not by
their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different
race, according t [sic] the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception, and which is
opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their
savage nature; one which measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.”).
105
Harring, supra note 83, at 192 (“[W]hile Crow Dog was an important victory, the case was infused with
a distorted fact situation that characterized Brule law as ‘lawless,’ the killing as ‘red man’s revenge’, [sic] and
the Brule Sioux as a ‘people without law.’ This characterization continues to describe the case, undermining its
importance as a sovereignty decision, and undermining the whole concept of tribal sovereignty.”).
106
E.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1968 (2019) (“[T]he people, by adopting the
Constitution, ‘split the atom of sovereignty’. . . . ‘When the original States declared their independence,
they claimed the powers inherent in sovereignty . . . . The Constitution limited but did not abolish the
sovereign powers of the States, which retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”’” (quoting Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) and then quoting Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018))).
101
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In 1885, in response to Crow Dog,107 Congress enacted the Indian Major Crimes
Act (MCA).108 The MCA established federal jurisdiction over Indians who
committed an enumerated offense in two locations, and specified the federal law that
would apply to those prosecutions.109 One, enumerated crimes committed by Indians
within federal territories, whether on or off reservation, would be tried in territorial
courts and subject to the laws of the territory.110 Two, enumerated crimes committed
by Indians on reservations situated within a state would be subject to the laws of the
United States and tried in federal court (in other words, would become subject to
enclave jurisdiction).111 The crimes enumerated in the MCA are crimes of personal
violence—like the murder in Crow Dog.112
Federal MCA jurisdiction requires proof that the defendant is an “Indian.” But,
unlike ICCA jurisdiction, the Indian/non-Indian status of the victim is irrelevant. 113
107
For an in-depth treatment of Crow Dog and the political and cultural dynamics surrounding
enactment of the Major Crimes Act, see Harring, supra note 83, at 191–92, 195 (“A closer analysis of
Crow Dog reveals the extension of criminal law over reservation Indians was the product of a broad
national movement toward an assimilationist Indian policy. . . . [A]nalysis of primary documents shows
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs cultivated Crow Dog as a test case (and tried to create other test cases
both before and after Crow Dog) to gain precisely the end that was won: criminal jurisdiction over the
Indian tribes. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had been attempting to get such jurisdiction since 1874
because BIA officials felt that they needed the coercive power of the criminal law to help force the
assimilation of the Indians—the forceable application of criminal law as one painful way to learn civics.”).
108
Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,
3242) (“That immediately upon and after the date of the passage of this act all Indians, committing against
the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny within any Territory of the
United States, and either within or without an Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of
such Territory relating to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same courts and in the same manner
and shall be subject to the same penalties as are all other persons charged with the commission of said
crimes, respectively; and the said courts are hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such Indians
committing any of the above crimes against the person or property of another Indian or other person within
the boundaries of any State of the United States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall be
subject to the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same manner, and subject to the same penalties
as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.”).
109
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153). As
noted, the original version of the MCA enumerated seven offenses. See supra note 108. The current version
of the MCA enumerates thirteen offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). The crimes are offenses against the person,
such as murder and assault that, if committed in a state jurisdiction, have historically been left to state
governments to prosecute and punish. The enumerated offenses in the current version of the MCA are:

murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [to wit: sexual
abuse], incest, a felony assault under section 113 [to wit: federal enclave assault], an assault
against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 [to wit: federal enclave embezzlement
and theft].

Id. These enumerated offenses are, for the most part, defined by distinct federal statutes. As noted,
under the Assimilative Crimes Act, offenses that are not defined by federal law are defined and punished
in accordance with the law of the state where the crime was committed. Id. § 1153(b).
113
Under the MCA, a defendant’s Indian status is an element of the crime, but the MCA does not
provide a statutory definition for the term. This has given rise to an entire body of common law defining
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As a technical statutory matter, for the crimes enumerated in the MCA, the MCA
modified the ICCA’s federal enclave jurisdiction exceptions for offenses by one
Indian against another and offenses for which prior tribal punishment had been
imposed. Its real significance, however, is that it displaced tribes’ sovereign and
inherent authority to impose their own laws to address serious wrongdoing among
their own members free from colonialist justice intervention. For a statute that
occasioned such a momentous adjustment in tribal sovereignty vis-à-vis the national
government, it was enacted with relatively little discussion. 114
The constitutionality of the MCA was challenged in United States v. Kagama,
the first prosecution under the MCA considered by the Court. 115 The United States
charged Kagama, an Indian, with the murder of Iyouse, an Indian, committed within
the boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, located within the State of
California. 116 The United States also charged Mahawaha, an Indian, with aiding and
abetting in the murder.117 The United States contended that Congress had authority
to assert federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians in Indian territories
under its power to regulate commerce with tribes under the Indian Commerce
Clause.118 The Court rejected the proposition that the federal government’s power to
prosecute crimes committed by Indians in Indian country was governed by the
Constitution.119 It looked outside the Constitution instead, and concluded that this
the term “Indian” for purposes of the MCA (and other federal Indian country criminal laws) that continues
to evolve. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 10 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 49, 49–51 (2017). The Court upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153
in United States v. Antelope against an equal protection challenge. 430 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1977). In
Antelope, the Court rejected an argument that the MCA relies on an impermissible racial classification,
holding that the statutory scheme “is rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate people’ with
their own political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of
once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a ‘“racial” group consisting
of “Indians”. . . .’” Id. at 646 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974)).
114
Harring, supra note 83, at 230 (1989) (“[T]he Major Crimes Act of 1885 is not difficult to
understand. While it was a clear departure from existing practice, it was consistent with the whole general
trend of Indian policy, the move from a policy based on treaty rights recognizing Indian sovereignty to one
of dependency and forced assimilation. A whole line of introduced legislation, and BIA administrative
policy, going back ten years had laid a foundation for the Act. . . . All who have written on the Act have
expressed amazement at the ease with which such a departure from existing policy passed through
Congress, as an afterthought on the Indian Appropriations bill. The discussion of the Act fills less than five
pages of the Congressional Record, and those pages are largely filled with confusion over language. A
discussion over a federal law prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians going on in the same Congress received
far more detailed discussion. This lack of attention testifies that while the Major Crimes Act may have been
a sharp departure from existing Indian law, it was completely consistent with existing Indian policy.”).
115
118 U.S. 375, 376–77 (1886).
116
Id. at 376.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 378; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
. . . with the Indian Tribes[.]”); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law
in the Supreme Court, 40 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. MAGAZINE (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2014_vol_40/vol-40--no--1--tribal-sovereignty/short_history_of_indian_law/ [https://perma.cc/PD9D-WS8D] (“Congress
quickly passed the Major Crimes Act, expressly authorizing federal criminal jurisdiction in such cases.
Kagama was the first prosecution under the Act to reach the Supreme Court. For the first time, the Court
addressed the source of Congress’ constitutional authority over Indian affairs and Indian country.”).
119
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379–80.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813968

318

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 109

power derived from United States’ trust responsibility to Indian tribes. 120 Kagama is
significant because, for the first time, the Court fixed the source of Congress’ power
over Indian country and matters pertaining to tribal nations in a generalized federal
interest “in maintaining law and order on Indian lands, and protecting Indian people
from states and their citizens” located outside the Constitution. 121
The MCA provides that Indians who commit enumerated offenses in Indian
country “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.”122 This language was clearly intended to exclude states from exercising
jurisdiction over crimes enumerated in the MCA committed by Indians in Indian
country. It is not clear, however, whether Congress also intended the language
“within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States” to extinguish tribes’
jurisdiction over enumerated crimes committed by Indians in Indian country in favor
of exclusive federal jurisdiction, or whether it intended to assert jurisdiction
concurrently with tribes.123 After Congress enacted the MCA, in Indian country,
jurisdiction over enumerated crimes committed by an Indian (regardless of the status
of the victim) rested with the federal government; to the extent the conduct also
violated a tribal law, concurrent jurisdiction rested with the tribe in whose territory
the conduct occurred;124 jurisdiction over a crime committed by a
non-Indian against an Indian rested exclusively with the federal government under
the ICCA; and jurisdiction over a crime committed by a non-Indian against another
non-Indian lay with the state within whose borders the Indian country was located
under McBratney.125
120

Id. at 384–85.
Fletcher, supra note 118; Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–85.
122
18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
123
Id. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, whether tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts over offenses covered by the Major Crimes Act remains an “open question.” U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, Crim. Res. Manual § 679 (2020) https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminalresource-manual-679-major-crimes-act-18-usc-1153 [https://perma.cc/4PG2-VU6M]. But see Wetsit v.
Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing that tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction over crimes
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act); Droske, supra note 73, at 737 (“Tribes . . . share concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal government over Indian defendants who have violated the Major Crimes Act
although tribal courts are subject to the sentencing limitations imposed by the Indian Civil Rights Act.”).
124
Tribes covered by the MCA can, and do, independently criminalize, prosecute and punish crimes
covered by the MCA under their own laws. The catch, as discussed infra, is that under ICRA, tribes cannot
impose a punishment over one year in non-TLOA prosecutions, or over nine years in TLOA prosecutions,
even for the most serious crimes committed in their communities. 25 U.S.C. §1302(a)(7).
125
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). Two Indian reservations in the United
States straddle state borders. The Standing Rock Reservation is located within the geographic borders of
North and South Dakota, and the Navajo Nation lies within the geographic borders of Utah, Arizona, and
New Mexico. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Lands of Federally Recognized Tribes of the United States
(illustration) (June 2016), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ots/webteam/pdf/idc1028635.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL6Q-EHJ5]. This gives rise to a number of jurisdictional anomalies,
including the possibility of different states exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed on different parts
of the same reservation under different laws, constitutions, and procedural rules. A similar anomaly exists
on the federal court level—the boundaries for the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal established by Congress
place the Navajo Nation in both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits. Thus, a split between these circuits on
an issue of federal law can subject conduct on the Navajo Nation to different interpretations of the same
federal law. Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeal and United States District
121
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This jurisdictional scheme was in place for sixty-eight years until Congress
passed Public Law 280 (PL 280) in 1953.126 PL 280 was part of a Congressional
policy to terminate reservations and relocate Indians to urban areas with the goal of
encouraging assimilation into colonialist society. 127 In doing so, Congress virtually
eliminated the federal government’s responsibility for law enforcement on
reservations covered by PL 280 and offloaded it onto states. Congress enacted PL
280, it should be noted, without the consent of the tribes or states impacted by the
law.128 In states and reservations covered by PL 280, the law eliminated federal MCA
and ICCA criminal jurisdiction and associated law enforcement responsibilities129
and transferred them to individual states.130 Some states were forced to accept Indian
Courts (illustration), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G54Z-LWC5].
126
Troy A. Eid & Carrie Covington Doyle, Separate But Unequal: The Federal Criminal Justice
System in Indian Country, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 1082–83, 1098 n.140 (2010).
127
In August 1953, Congress endorsed House Concurrent Resolution 108 which is widely regarded
as the principal statement of the termination policy:
[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the
territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status
as wards of the United States, and to grant them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining to
American citizenship[.]

H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953). The same month, Congress enacted PL 280. Act of Aug. 15,
1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360). In states covered
by PL 280, except for specific reservations, it eliminated federal jurisdiction over Indian country crimes
based on 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (the Indian Country Crimes Act/General Crimes Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(the Major Crimes Act), and required the state to prosecute crimes in Indian country that would have
otherwise been prosecuted by the federal government. 18 U.S.C. §1162.
128
Until Congress passed PL 280, state court jurisdiction in Indian country was generally limited
under McBratney to crimes committed by non-Indians that were either victimless or committed against
another non-Indian. Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over
Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 928–29 (2012). As one source
observes, “the states were not as eager to control the reservations as the advocates of termination had
expected” and, as a result, in some Indian communities, law and order disappeared entirely. Andrew
Boxer, Native Americans and the Federal Government, HIST. TODAY (Sept. 2009),
https://www.historytoday.com/archive/native-americans-and-federal-government
[https://perma.cc/84T7-C8Z4]. Amendments to PL 280 in 1968, the same year ICRA was enacted, added
a tribal consent requirement and authorized states to return (or “retrocede”) jurisdiction to the federal
government. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, sec. 403, 82 Stat. 73, 79 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1323). The tribal consent requirement only applied to future transfers of
jurisdiction to the states; it did not apply to transfers of jurisdiction prior to 1968. No tribal nation has
consented to state PL 280 jurisdiction since Congress amendment PL 280 in 1968. Section 221 of TLOA
authorizes tribes covered by PL 280 to request that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) re-assume federal
criminal jurisdiction on their reservation. Act of July 29, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 221, § 1162(d),
124 Stat. 2258, 2271–72 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162). If the DOJ grants the request,
the federal government may once again prosecute criminal cases from PL 280 reservations. 28 C.F.R. §
50.25(a)(1) (2020) (authorizing federal criminal jurisdiction in certain areas of Indian country).
129
PL 280 also impacted tribes’ civil jurisdiction, a topic beyond the scope of this discussion. For a
comprehensive discussion of PL 280, see Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues
and Concerns for Victims of Crime in Indian Country, AM. INDIAN DEV. ASSOCS., LLC,
http://www.aidainc.net/Publications/pl280.htm [https://perma.cc/3H4L-X7DL].
130
PL 280 did not affect federal criminal jurisdiction over federal crimes of general applicability
under Title 18 (i.e., federal prosecutions not based solely on territorial jurisdiction), such as: drug offenses,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813968

320

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 109

country jurisdiction—called “mandatory” states.131 Others were allowed to opt in to
PL 280.132 Thus, after 1958, on reservations covered by PL 280, what criminal
jurisdiction tribes had at this juncture became concurrent with the states, instead of
the federal government.
McBratney notwithstanding, many tribes, courts, and legal authorities assumed
that tribes retained jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian country by
anyone, Indians and non-Indians alike, concurrently with either the state or federal
government. In 1978, the Court said otherwise in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe.133 Oliphant, with little support in history or law, held that tribes could not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians without Congress’ express
authorization.134 According to the Oliphant Court, tribes had been implicitly divested
of their inherent sovereign power to prosecute non-Indians under the “implicit
divestiture doctrine.”135 Under that doctrine, tribes could only exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians if Congress expressly granted them that authority
because an exercise of this power would be inconsistent with their status as domestic
nations dependent on the U.S. federal government. 136 The Court reasoned that tribes’
bank robbery, felon in possession of firearm, mail fraud, embezzlement or theft from tribal organization,
theft from a casino, or failure to report child abuse. A DOJ Indian country jurisdiction chart is available
at Arvo Q. Mikkanen, Indian Country Criminal Jurisdictional Chart, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usaowdok/legacy/2014/03/25/Indian%20Country%20Criminal%20Jurisdiction%20ChartColor2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FUY-Z726]. A Tribal Court Clearinghouse chart is available at: General Guide to
Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.tribalinstitute.org/lists/jurisdiction.htm [https://perma.cc/N3UR-U8DL].
131
The “mandatory” PL 280 jurisdictions were Alaska, California, Minnesota (except the Red Lake
Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. §1360.
132
Between 1953 and 1968, a number of other states opted in to PL 280 and elected to assume full or
partial jurisdiction over Indian country within their borders. The “optional” PL 280 states are Arizona
(1967), Florida (1961), Idaho (1963, subject to tribal consent), Iowa (1967), Montana (1963), Nevada
(1955), North Dakota (1963, subject to tribal consent), South Dakota (1957-1961), Utah (1971), and
Washington (1957-1963). American Indians and Alaska Natives - Public Law 280 Tribes, ADMIN. FOR
NATIVE AMS. (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ana/resource/american-indians-and-alaskanatives-public-law-280-tribes [https://perma.cc/RLM8-2BGB].
133
435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit
crimes in Indian country “absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”). As discussed infra,
with VAWA 2013, Congress repealed Oliphant in part and authorized tribes to exercise limited
jurisdiction over some non-Indians for some domestic violence crimes if they meet certain procedural
requirements. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, § 1304,
127 Stat. 54, 120–23 (2013) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 1304).
134
435 U.S. at 212.
135
Id. at 210–11; see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Incorporation Without Assimilation: Legislating
Tribal Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 165, 168 (2019).
136
Skibine, supra note 135, at 168 (“The United States began signing treaties with Indian nations in
1778, and in 1831 the U.S. Supreme Court described the Indian nations existing within the territorial
boundaries of the United States as domestic dependent nations. Until 1978 [when Oliphant was decided],
Indian nations were thought to possess all the inherent sovereign powers over their territories that had not
been taken away by the U.S. Congress or given up in treaties. However, preoccupied by the assertion of
tribal jurisdiction over individuals who were not tribal members, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978 devised
what became known as the implicit divesture doctrine. Under that doctrine, Indian tribes are said to have
lost all inherent sovereign powers inconsistent with their status as domestic dependent nations. As a result
of this doctrine, since 1978, the tribes initially lost all inherent criminal jurisdiction over nontribal
members, and . . . a good deal of civil and regulatory jurisdiction as well.” (citations omitted)); see also
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exercise of this type of power in the criminal jurisdiction context would undermine
the interests of the federal government because it risked “unwarranted intrusions” on
the personal liberty of U.S. citizens. 137 The upshot of Oliphant was that, as of 1978,
only state or federal courts had jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by
non-Indians in Indian country. In 1990, the Court subsequently held in Duro v. Reina
that tribes only had jurisdiction over Indians that were members of that tribe, and not
Indians who belonged to other tribes (referred to as “non-member” Indians).138
Congress quickly overrode this holding with a statute commonly referred to as the
“Duro Fix,” which made clear that tribes had jurisdiction over all Indians, not just
members of their own tribe.139
Oliphant, more than any other federal incursion into tribal sovereignty, is often
held up as the origin of the jurisdictional void in Indian country, and a root cause of
today’s public safety crisis in Indian country. 140 Oliphant, in effect, declared
non-Indian offenders “off limits” to tribal law enforcement, and left prosecution of
non-Indians to state and federal governments who, unlike tribal governments, are not
directly answerable to the community in which the crime occurred. Thus, the Court
created a situation in which the community most affected by conduct was virtually
42 C.J.S. Indians § 168 (2020) (“[A]n Indian tribe has inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over ‘all Indians’” (citation omitted)). However, the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes does not extend
to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on a reservation unless specifically
authorized to assume such jurisdiction by Congress. Id. § 169.
137
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. For a comprehensive discussion of the Court’s issues with tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers in the civil context, see Skibine, supra note 136, at 170–83.
138
495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
139
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (recognizing and affirming “the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians”). The “Duro Fix,” for the first time, provided a federal statutory
definition of “Indian” to wit: “any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as
an Indian under [the Indian Major Crimes Act] if that person were to commit an offense listed in that
section in Indian country . . . .” Id. § 1301(4). This reference to the MCA, however, did not provide a
definitive definition of “Indian” since the MCA itself does not define the term. Skibine, supra note 113,
at 52–53 (“The legislative choice made in 1991 to incorporate by reference the meaning of “Indian” from
a previous law which itself did not define the term was puzzling, to say the least, and invited litigation
over that issue.”).
140
Mary Hudetz, US doubles tribal funding to fight violence against women, AP NEWS (Sept. 19,
2018), https://apnews.com/article/1824f1326e2b49c29e9ad0ffbe4c2990 (last accessed Jan. 15, 2021)
(“For decades, tribes largely had been unable to directly access money in a U.S. program aimed at
supporting crime victims nationwide—even as federal figures showed more than half of Native American
women faced sexual or domestic violence at some point in their lives. On some reservations, Native
American women are killed at a rate more than 10 times the national average . . . . Legal experts and
victims’ advocates blame underfunded police departments that lack the resources to investigate crimes
and lingering jurisdictional gaps among federal, tribal and local law enforcement agencies that often result
in cases going unprosecuted.”). This heightened risk of violence for indigenous persons is not unique to
the United States. Indigenous persons and communities face similar risks in Canada and other former
colonial nations. See generally NAT’L INQUIRY INTO MISSING & MURDERED INDIGENOUS WOMEN &
GIRLS, RECLAIMING POWER AND PLACE (2016), https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/final-report/
[https://perma.cc/Q3Y4-QFGY] (providing a comprehensive analysis of all forms of violence against
women of several tribes); Isabella Higgins & Sarah Collard, Lost, missing or murdered?, AUSTL. BROAD.
CO. (Dec. 8, 2019 6:18 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-08/australian-indigenous-womenare-overrepresented-missing-persons/11699974 [https://perma.cc/35A6-5QX3] (“Some of the country’s
most vulnerable people are going missing, and many are never found. In Canada they’re calling it a
genocide, but in Australia some states aren’t even keeping count.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813968

322

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 109

powerless to address it, and communities with little or no connection to the conduct
were relied on to prosecute it. The result was that many crimes of personal violence
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country have been
under-investigated and under-prosecuted. This void opened up opportunities to
commit crimes in Indian country with very low risk of punishment, a fact
not-unknown to non-Indian predators.141 As discussed, infra, this was the status quo
in Indian country for the next thirty-five years until Congress partially repudiated the
Oliphant doctrine with its VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA.
II. STATE AND TRIBAL COURT PROCEDURAL REFORM BY FEDERAL FIAT
A. The Supreme Court Federalizes State Court Criminal Procedure
The history of unequal treatment of racial and ethnic minorities in the United
States is deep, long, and frequently brutal. One of the most powerful tools in
perpetuating racial oppression in the United States was, and remains, state and local
criminal justice systems.142 Those systems traditionally operated with little federal
oversight because the primary right and responsibility to define, investigate,
prosecute, and punish wrongful conduct in the United States has historically rested
with local and state authorities, not the national government. 143 The Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—collectively, the “Reconstruction
Amendments”144—enacted following the Civil War were “meant to provide former
141
Rosay, supra note 14, at 4 (Post-Oliphant, “federally recognized tribes had no authority to
criminally prosecute non-Indian offenders, even for crimes committed in Indian Country. This essentially
provided immunity to non-Indian offenders and compromised the safety of American Indian and Alaska
Native women and men.”); see also Maren Machles, Carrie Cochran, Angela M. Hill, & Suzette Brewer,
A Broken Trust: Sexual Assault and Justice on Tribal Lands, NEWSY (Sept. 29, 2019),
https://www.newsy.com/stories/a-broken-trust-sexual-assault-and-justice-on-tribal-lands/
[https://perma.cc/T7GT-5RZW] (describing ramifications of stripping tribes of criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians); Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away With Almost Anything,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-landcriminals-can-get-away-with-almost-anything/273391/ [https://perma.cc/A2SH-ASHZ] (“It was as
though, tribal officers said, their lack of jurisdiction had encouraged a culture of lawlessness. Every officer
could recount being told by a non-Indian, ‘You can’t do anything to me. . . . Perpetrators think they can’t
be touched . . . [that they are] invincible.’”).
142
The harnessing of the state criminal justice system to perpetuate vestiges of slavery in the
United States is explored in filmmaker Ava DuVernay’s documentary “13th.” Juleyka
Lantigua-Williams, Ava DuVernay’s 13th Reframes American History, ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2016)
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/10/ava-duvernay-13th-netflix/503075/
[https://perma.cc/ST9Y-7K5K].
143
Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal
Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 508, 516 (1995) (neither the
Constitution nor debates among the Framers suggest “that the federal government was to have a significant
role in prosecuting crimes affecting the local community.”).
144
ERIC FONER, T HE SECOND FOUNDING : HOW THE C IVIL WAR AND R ECONSTRUCTION
R EMADE THE C ONSTITUTION xix (2019) (explaining that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery;
the Fourteenth Amendment “constitutionalized the principles of birthright citizenship and equality before
the law and sought to settle key issues arising from the war, such as the future political role of Confederate
leaders and the fate of Confederate debt[;]” and the Fifteenth Amendment “aimed to secure black male
suffrage throughout the reunited nation.”).
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slaves with access to the courts, ballot box, and public accommodations, and to
protect them against violence[.]”145 The Amendments “greatly enhanced the power
of the federal government . . . and forged a new constitutional relationship between
individual Americans and the national state . . . . ”146 Even after ratification of the
Reconstruction Amendments, however,147 the national Constitution operated only as
a “backdrop limitation” on states’ police power.148 This is due to the Court’s narrow
construction of the reach of the Reconstruction Amendments and early failure to
construe their provisions to provide robust protection to formerly enslaved
persons.149 This “was a choice” by the Justices, made “with little or no reflection on
the actual consequences . . . for black Americans” and part of “a sad chapter in the
history of race, citizenship, and democracy in the United States.” 150 Pertinent to this
discussion, the Fourteenth Amendment, in time, however, became the vehicle for an
expanded federal role in overseeing state justice systems.
It was not until 1925,151 one hundred thirty-four years after the Bill of Rights was
ratified that it was understood to constrain the actions of individual states.152 And the
mechanism for extending its mandates to the states was the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from passing or enforcing laws that
abridge the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens, from depriving any person of
145

Id.
Id. at xx.
147
The Civil War ended in 1865. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified
in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. The Constitution: Amendments 11–27, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27 [https://perma.cc/MDW4-AYC4].
148
Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65,
66–67 (“Although it was federal law, and thus ‘supreme,’ the Due Process Clause left substantial room
for the development and day-to-day operation of state criminal procedure doctrine. In other words, before
the [Criminal Procedure] Revolution, federal constitutional law affected the handling of state criminal
cases in much the same way that it affected other common kinds of state action, such as the regulation of
property rights or the administration of public schools and universities.”).
149
FONER, supra note 144, at 128–29 (“In interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
reduced the ‘privileges or immunities’ guaranteed to citizens to virtual insignificance . . . . [E]ventually
conclud[ing] that segregation legally enforced by a state did not violate the equal rights of black
Americans. The justices insisted that the amendment had not significantly altered the balance of power
between states and the nation, and proved unreceptive to claims that a state’s inaction in the face of
violence or other expressions of racial inequality provided justification for federal intervention.
Federalism, however, had its limits. Increasingly, the Court construed the Fourteenth Amendment as a
vehicle for protecting corporate rights rather than those of the former slaves . . . . The Court employed ‘a
state-centered approach in citizenship matters and a nation-centered approach in affairs of business.’”
(quotation omitted)).
150
Id. at 129, 131.
151
The proposed Bill of Rights was ratified when two-thirds of the states (ten of the then-fourteen)
approved ten of the proposed twelve Amendments to the Constitution on December 15, 1791. Today in
History – December 15, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/december-15/
[https://perma.cc/9PPA-35LK].
152
Latzer, supra note 5, at 70 (“Under the incorporation doctrine, certain rights in the Bill of Rights,
originally restrictions on only the federal government, become, when ‘incorporated’ into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, restrictions upon the state governments as well.” (citation omitted)).
Before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the development of the incorporation
doctrine, the Court specifically held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833). The Court also initially rejected incorporation after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1875).
146
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life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and it requires states to extend
the equal protection of the law to all persons.153 Under the incorporation doctrine,
the Court asks if an interest protected by a specific right is implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and, “as such, enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment.154 The Court’s approach has been labeled
“selective incorporation” because it is incremental; it considers each protection or
right set out in the Bill of Rights individually, rather than wholesale. 155
Incorporation is commonly understood as the Court’s response to the
“Mississippi Problem”—the failure of (primarily Southern) states to protect the
procedural rights of economically, racially marginalized defendants—mainly poor
Black defendants.156 States and local governments intent on continuing apartheid
were often able to accomplish through procedural rules and practices what the
substantive law could no longer legitimately do. States and local governments, for
example, could not enact or enforce laws that excluded Black men from serving on
juries because of their race. 157 But they could use facially-neutral procedural rules
and practices to keep them out of the jury pool and off individual juries. 158 The
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”). The Privileges or Immunities Clause is narrower than the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses in that it is limited to “citizens,” and the latter extends to all “persons.” Id. An alternative
incorporation argument, as yet adopted by a majority of the Court, is that the proper vehicle for extending the
Bill of Rights to the states is the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that Privileges or Immunities Clause is
an “eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the
States”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 813 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (taking issue with majority’s reliance on the Due Process Clause, rather than
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as vehicle for incorporation of Second Amendment). Soon after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, however, the Court “effectively reduced the amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause to insignificance. As a result, when the application of the Bill of Rights to the states later
took place, it was almost always under the [Due Process Clause] . . . which suggests procedural fairness, not
substantive rights.” FONER, supra note 144, at 76.
154
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949).
155
Latzer, supra note 5, at 67–68.
156
Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of
Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106–07 (2005) (recognizing the Court’s criminal procedure
incorporation cases as a branch of “race law” because they arose in the context of federal judicial reaction
to institutionalized racism in state criminal justice systems following Reconstruction and in the context of
the struggle for civil rights); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997) (“The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal
procedure arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system was treating black suspects and defendants
much worse than white ones. Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of
antidiscrimination law.”).
157
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that state statute disqualifying blacks
from jury service violates federal equal protection).
158
Nancy S. Marder, The Changing Composition of the American Jury, in THEN AND NOW: STORIES
OF LAW AND PROGRESS 66, 70–71 (Lori Andrews & Sarah Harding eds., 2013) (After Reconstruction,
Black men “‘virtually disappeared from the southern jury box by 1900, even in counties where they
constituted an overwhelming majority of the local population.’ [Although state] statutes could no longer
prohibit African-American men from serving on the jury after Strauder, other practices kept them from
the jury box. . . . These practices ranged from color-coding by race the names placed in the wheel from
which jurors were selected to the discretion exercised by white jury commissioners in selecting only white
153
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working premise of incorporation was “that the state bench was, at its worst racist
and incompetent, and merely competent most of the time.”159 Constitutional criminal
procedure in the United States can only be understood against the backdrop of the
Supreme Court’s distrust of state courts’ ability or willingness to protect criminal
defendants’ rights. As discussed below, federal incorporation of Bill of Rights
protections into ICRA and limitations on tribal court criminal jurisdiction must
similarly be understood to rest on assumptions by the Court and Congress that tribal
justice systems are incompetent and cannot be trusted to deal fairly with criminal
defendants in general, and non-Indians in particular.
The Court’s earliest incorporation cases primarily addressed the guarantees under
the First Amendment.160 In the 1960s and 1970s, over one hundred and fifty years
after the Bill of Rights was ratified and one hundred years after adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Warren Court began a process of extending criminal
procedural rights in the Bill of Rights to the states through Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation.161 Today, most of the criminal procedure guarantees contained in the
men whom they knew to serve as jurors. . . . The practice of discriminatory peremptory challenges, which
continues to this day, was another way to keep African-Americans from being selected for petit juries.”).
159
Latzer, supra note 5, at 65 (“Incorporation was also predicated upon an assumption—a very
negative assumption—about the states, and especially about state courts. The assumption was that some
state courts were chronically, and virtually all state courts were occasionally, backward. Without the
Supreme Court to stand over them, ready to review and reverse, the state courts would fail to provide the
minimal rights that all defendants were entitled to at all times. In short, incorporation was motivated by
the Mississippi Problem: the assumption that the state bench was, at its worst racist and incompetent, and
merely competent most of the time.”); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 813, 818 (1998) (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence is still haunted by a theory of state autonomy it
inherited from nineteenth-century jurisprudence . . . rooted in contempt and distrust for state officials. The
implicit premise of this theory . . . was that state officials were parochial, deceitful, and nonuniform
policymakers whose incompetence or untrustworthiness disqualified them from exercising any federal
functions. In its purest form, such a nationalistic theory barred Congress from delegating federal
responsibilities to state officials even when state officials were willing to accept such duties.”).
160
E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dictum) (freedom of speech); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (freedom of press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
364 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise of
religion); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1947) (establishment of religion); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958) (freedom of expressive association); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 229–30, 237 (1963) (petition for redress of grievances).
161
Donald A. Dripps, Does Liberal Procedure Cause Punitive Substance? Preliminary Evidence from
Some Natural Experiments, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 463 (2014) (“The Warren Court’s criminal procedure
revolution had three primary components; the exclusionary rule [under Mapp], the right to counsel [under
Gideon], and Miranda.”). As Professor Dripps notes, it is important to recognize that many states had
already adopted similar or identical protections for defendants before the Court required them. Id. (“The
impact of the revolution, however, was not uniform across jurisdictions. About half the states had adopted
the exclusionary rule before Mapp, and a majority of states provided indigent felony defendants
court-appointed counsel before Gideon. No jurisdiction anticipated Miranda exactly, but some
jurisdictions were regulating police interrogation more rigorously than others. It is therefore possible to
compare the effects of the Warren Court decisions in jurisdictions where their impact was
dramatic—indeed ‘revolutionary’—with jurisdictions where their impact, although significant, was far
smaller.”). Although the Court’s incorporation process continues, see, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.
Ct. 1390, 1394–95 (2020), the core decisions emanated from the Warren Court and were issued within a
relatively short time period. Dripps, supra, at 473 (“The criminal procedure revolution began with Mapp
in 1961, reached highwater with Escobedo in 1964, and was all but finished by Miranda in 1966 or at
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Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have been extended to the states.162 Following
incorporation, the minimum procedural protections states must extend to defendants
in criminal investigations and prosecutions is determined primarily, if not
exclusively, by reference to the Court’s interpretation of the scope of specific
guarantees under the Bill of Rights. Where the Court has incorporated a particular
provision of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, a state criminal
procedure or process may not fall below the floor of protection required by the
Federal Constitution. Individual state criminal processes and procedures may, of
course, offer more protection to a criminal suspect or defendant. But they may not
offer less than what the Court has identified as the federal constitutional minimum.163
latest Berger and Katz in 1967.”); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence obtained
through unconstitutional searches inadmissible in state prosecutions); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
490–91 (1964) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to police interrogations of suspects); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 491 (1966) (statements during police interrogation inadmissible due to
Fifth Amendment violations); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1967) (warrants require
particularity because use of electronic devices to capture conversations constitutes a Fourth Amendment
“search”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects “what [a person]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public . . . .”).
162
E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (unreasonable search or seizure prohibition); Mapp,
367 U.S. at 655–66, 671–72 (exclusionary rule); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115–16 (1964) (warrant
requirement), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
30 (1963) (warrantless search or seizure standard); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (double
jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (self-incrimination); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 216, 223 (1967) (speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (public trial and notice
of accusations); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968) (trial by impartial jury for non-petty
offenses); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315–16 (1972) (per curiam) (notice of accusations); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18
(1967) (compulsory process); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (assistance of appointed counsel
in capital cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338, 344 (1963) (assistance of appointed counsel
in felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (assistance of appointed counsel if
actually incarcerated for misdemeanors); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (dictum) (excessive
bail); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); Baze v. Rees,
553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (dictum) (excessive bail); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019)
(excessive fines); Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (criminal jury unanimity). Specific guarantees the Court has
not incorporated include the right to presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury and the right to have a
jury selected from residents of the state and district where a crime is committed. Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (grand jury right not incorporated); Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345–46 (6th
Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (right to have a jury selected from residents of the state and district where the
crime occurred not incorporated); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Zicarelli v.
Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 313 (3d Cir. 1980) (same).
163
Latzer, supra note 5, at 75 (“By its very nature, incorporation established United States Supreme
Court hegemony over the state bench. As the ultimate interpreter of the federal Bill of Rights, the Supreme
Court became the final authority regarding the scope and nature of its guarantees; the state courts were to
be compelled to conform to national mandates established by the Supreme Court, absent more protective
state procedures. In the 1960s, and for the next two decades, as criminal procedure rose to the top of the
Supreme Court’s agenda, the Court rendered dozens of decisions glossing the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Amendments. Each such decision established an imperative for state proceedings, which the state
courts could enlarge, but never deny. Incorporation thus shifted the initiative for developing criminal
procedure law from the state courts and state legislatures to the United States Supreme Court.”); see also
Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 148, at 77, 79 (“Before the 1960s, the states were relatively free to go
about their business, making and applying state criminal procedure law (or simply acting according to the
discretionary judgments and practices of state or local officials), so long as they did not run afoul of the
broad limitations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In this way, federal constitutional law
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Incorporation produced “a detailed, national Code of Criminal Procedure that
almost totally supersedes state law.”164 It has ensured a uniform national baseline of
criminal procedural guarantees in state criminal investigation and prosecution. And
it has been criticized for hindering development of jurisdictionally-tailored
approaches to criminal justice reform and innovation on the state and local level.165
The enforcement mechanism for these rights is the writ of habeas corpus, a tool
whose utility in policing state deprivations of federal constitutional rights has been
greatly constrained by Congress in the post-Warren Court era.166 The upshot of
Congress’ adjustments to habeas corpus law is that state adherence to the procedural
mandates imposed by the Court through its incorporation jurisprudence has become
much less closely supervised by the federal courts since the mid-1990s.
It is fair to ask whether the federalization of criminal procedure met its goal of
producing fairer and more color-blind state and local criminal justice practices in the
United States. In 2021, state and local detainees can still disappear into local criminal
justice systems for extended periods of time, notwithstanding the Sixth
Amendment’s speedy trial mandate;167 state prosecutors still use jury selection
procedures to exclude minority jurors from serving; 168 and, throughout the United
. . . provided a vaguely defined ‘floor’ of constitutional protection below which the states could not fall,
but otherwise was not a significant presence in the day-to-day work of state officials and state judges.
When the Court incorporated most of the specific criminal procedure guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . it radically transformed the
role of federal constitutional law in state criminal cases . . . . [W]herever federal criminal procedure law
exists today, that law dominates the landscape.”).
164
Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 148, at 67.
165
Latzer, supra note 5, at 64–65 (“[I]ncorporation forced the states to adopt uniform procedures
without regard to local needs. . . . No matter how costly, no matter how inefficient, no matter how difficult
to implement, no matter how much injustice they might cause, and no matter how inappropriate to local
circumstances they might be, the state courts have had to give effect to these federal procedural rights.
These disadvantages of incorporation were acknowledged even in the 1960s, but they were believed to be
outweighed by one important value: equality. Whatever the disadvantages in stifling state uniqueness,
independence, and freedom to experiment, the advantage of uniform treatment of defendants throughout
the United States, at least with respect to the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights, seemed to justify
incorporation.” (citation omitted)).
166
Congress undertook a major overhaul of federal habeas review with the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 104, § 2254, 110 Stat. 1214,
1218 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)). One of the outcomes of this overhaul was to limit the reach of
the writ and codify the process federal courts are required to follow in reviewing state and federal
prisoners’ habeas petitions. 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND P ROCEDURE § 4261.1 (3d ed. 2020) (“Congress made many important changes in habeas corpus in
1996. . . . The changes restrict habeas corpus but they do not virtually eliminate it, as some critics would
have preferred.” (citations omitted)).
167
Report Released Concerning Lengthy Pre-Trial Incarceration in Mississippi, WLOX (June 20,
2019, 6:15 PM), https://www.wlox.com/2019/06/20/report-released-concerning-lengthy-pre-trialincarceration-mississippi/ (last accessed Jan. 15, 2020) (notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment speedy
trial right, which has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, “[t]housands of people are held
in Mississippi’s county and regional jails awaiting indictment and trial” and of “more than 5,700 people
incarcerated in local jails as of May 2019[, r]oughly 2,750 of those detainees had been in jail longer than
90 days. More than 800 people have been stuck in county jails over a year.”).
168
Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Gap on Race and Juries, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/opinion/the-supreme-courts-gap-on-race-andjuries.html [https://perma.cc/XS7E-PR7T].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3813968

328

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 109

States, racial and ethnic minorities are over-represented in the criminal system. 169
The legal defense of the poor, mandated by the Court for felonies and many
misdemeanors, is provided by overburdened and underfunded public defenders. 170
Despite incorporation, many contemporary state and local defendants, who are
overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately non-White, have been relegated to a
lesser justice, not afforded a more equal one.
B. Congress Federalizes Tribal Court Criminal Procedure
Incorporation reached its peak in the 1960s, during the Civil Rights Era. This is
the backdrop against which Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA),171 a rider to the Civil Rights Act of 1968.172 An earlier statute, the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, had authorized the creation of an independent, bipartisan,
fact-finding Commission on Civil Rights. One of the items the Commission focused
on in its first report, issued in 1961, was the lack of constitutional protection for
individual Indians.173 After that report issued, Congress, through a subcommittee,
spent eight years studying the need to protect “the rights of individual
American Indians from being infringed by Indian tribes exercising powers of

169
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA,
AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-onracial-disparities/ [https://perma.cc/AV33-SUUK].
170
Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After ‘Gideon’, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-tocounsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/ [https://perma.cc/9EPV-DG99] (“Today, there is a vast gulf
between the broad premise of the ruling and the grim practice of legal representation for the nation’s
poorest litigants. Yes, you have the right to a court-appointed lawyer today—the right to a lawyer who
almost certainly is vastly underpaid and grossly overworked; a lawyer who, according to a Brennan Center
for Justice report published [in 2012], often spends less than six minutes per case at hearings where clients
plead guilty and are sentenced. With this lawyer—often just a ‘potted plant’—by your side, you’ve earned
the dubious honor of hearing the judge you will face declare that this arrangement is sufficient to secure
your rights to a fair trial.”); see also Sara Mayeux, Gideon v. Wainwright in the Age of a Public Defense
Crisis, TALKPOVERTY (May 9, 2016), https://talkpoverty.org/2016/05/09/gideon-wainwright-age-publicdefense-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/5ZMN-834R] (“Throughout the United States, public defenders have
used the word ‘crisis’ for decades as shorthand for the combination of volatile funding, understaffing, and
excessive per-lawyer caseloads that has persistently plagued many defender offices.”). Among other
unforeseen consequences of increasing the costs of criminal prosecutions is the increasing use of court
fees and surcharges levied against criminal defendants to help prop up severely under-funded local court
systems. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH : M ONETARY S ANCTIONS AS
PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (exposing how the use of monetary sanctions for punishing
criminals perpetuates socioeconomic and racial inequalities).
171
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304.
172
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
173
5 U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., JUSTICE: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 131, 133 (1961)
(“The subtleties of the Indian’s legal status are nowhere more evident than in the area of the Bill of Rights.
For while neither Congress nor the States may infringe the basic civil rights of Indians—in this respect,
they enjoy the same status as other citizens—Indians are not so protected against the actions of tribal
governments. . . . Comparable limitations could be imposed on tribal governments by constitutional
amendment or, very likely, by congressional action.”).
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self-government.”174 ICRA—which conferred some, but not all, of the protections
set out in the Bill of Rights on Indians by statute and created a writ of habeas remedy
to enforce those rights in federal court—was the response to these concerns. 175
Federal courts initially held that Indians deprived of their ICRA rights had an implied
civil cause of action against their tribal government to vindicate those rights. 176 In
1978, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, however, the Court held that a litigants’
exclusive vehicle for seeking a federal court remedy of an ICRA violation was
through a writ of habeas corpus. 177 It found that an implied cause of action would
upset the balance between individual rights and tribal autonomy Congress had
intended to establish in ICRA. 178
ICRA, among other things, sets a uniform federal procedural minimum tribes
must meet in the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of wrongdoing in Indian
country. It is Congress’ statutory analog to the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation jurisprudence. Thus, as with states, tribal court criminal procedure is
heavily regulated by the federal government, but by the national legislature, not the
national court.179 Just as the Court’s incorporation doctrine was animated by a
distrust of state courts, Congress and the Court’s engagement with tribes reveals a
deep skepticism about tribal courts’ fairness and competence, especially in dealing
with non-Indians.180 The Major Crimes Act and Oliphant, discussed above, reflect
174
The Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings on S. 961, S. 962, S. 963, S. 964, S.
965, S. 966, S. 967, S. 968, and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rts. of the Comm. of the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 2 (1965); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978)
(“[Congress’] legislative investigation revealed that . . . serious abuses of tribal power had occurred in the
administration of criminal justice.”); S. REP. NO. 90-841, at 7 (1967) (defining the purpose of the report
to be “recommend[ing] to the Congress a model code governing the administration of justice by courts of
Indian offenses on Indian reservations; to protect the constitutional rights of certain individuals . . . .”);
Burnett, supra note 20, at 577 (analyzing the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights evaluation of the
broad “constitutional neglect” on Indian rights).
175
Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearing on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affs. of the H. Comm. on Interior & Insular Affs. 31 (1968) (statement of Rep. Glenn
Cunningham) (ICRA “would grant to the American Indians enumerated constitutional rights and
protection from arbitrary action in their relationship with tribal governments . . . .”).
176
E.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (describing 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as “a
statute which by its terms does not authorize the filing of a civil action, but is merely declarative of the
rights of citizens of the United States,” and noting that “the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is couched in
declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement does not, of course, prevent a federal
court from fashioning an effective equitable remedy.” (citation omitted)); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp.
629, 638 (D. Utah 1973).
177
436 U.S. 49, 70–71 (1978).
178
Id.
179
Of course, many tribes meet or exceed the Bill of Rights’ procedural requirements, just as many
states afford criminal defendants in their courts more protection than that required under Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 417 (2011) (“In
general, tribal courts apply a higher standard of care to tribal law enforcement officials, often requiring
greater criminal procedure guarantees to tribal criminal defendants than those they would otherwise
receive in state or federal courts.”).
180
Skibine, supra note 136, at 180, 197 (“[M]any nontribal judges see tribal law as foreign and different
than regular American law. . . . For forty years, the Supreme Court has been engaged in a measured attack on
tribal sovereignty when it comes to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. . . . to protect or shield nonmembers
from tribal tribunals out of an inordinate fear that these tribunals will not be fair to nonmembers.”); see also
Developments in the Law – Indian Law, supra note 50, at 1716–18 (“As has been shown, throughout
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this. ICRA and its TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments, discussed below,
perpetuate it. Indeed, the architecture of the current version of ICRA is structured on
a normative judgment that dispositions of wrongdoing in tribal communities can only
be valid or trusted if they are the product of procedures and processes that conform
to colonialist notions of due process and justice.
As noted, the Bill of Rights has no force in Indian country. Thus, ICRA
accomplishes by Congressional mandate what the Constitution cannot. It includes
almost every procedural protection in the Bill of Rights using language borrowed
from the Constitution.181 ICRA regulates searches and seizures;182 warrants;183
double jeopardy;184 compelled self-incrimination;185 jury trials;186 and notice of
charges, confrontation of witness, compulsory process, and assistance of counsel. 187
ICRA also regulates bail, fines, and punishments; 188 equal protection and due
process;189 and bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. 190 The only Constitutional
procedural rights omitted from the 1968 version of ICRA are the right to appointed
counsel for indigents, and the right to an “impartial” jury, a term the Court defined
post-1968 as a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community using a
process that does not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the
community.191 Congress did not include a right to “impartial” jury in the 1968
version of ICRA presumably to reflect that fact that tribes may limit jury service to
members of that tribe.192 With respect to appointed counsel for indigents, it is
important to note that tribes’ sentencing authority in 1968 was limited to
misdemeanor penalties––six-months incarceration and a $500 fine.193 At that time,
the Court had not yet recognized a federal constitutional right to counsel for indigents

European- and federal-Indian relations there has been a history of suspicion of Indian law and
self-government. And although Congress came to accept that tribal courts would have jurisdiction over some
cases, it became concerned with reports of abuse and the lack of Bill of Rights protections for tribal members.
Congress passed ICRA to bring (most of) the Bill of Rights to tribal lands . . . .”).
181
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
182
Id. § 1302(a)(2).
183
Id.
184
Id. § 1302(a)(3).
185
Id. § 1302(a)(4).
186
Id. § 1302(a)(10).
187
Id. § 1302(a)(6).
188
Id. § 1302(a)(7)(A).
189
Id. § 1302(a)(8).
190
Id. § 1302(a)(9). Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder prohibitions are in the original U.S.
Constitution, not the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
191
Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV.
433, 478 (2005) (identifying “the two primary rights ‘missing’ from [the 1968 version of] ICRA [as] free
representation for indigent defendants and a jury that includes nonmembers”). The Court established the
fair cross section test for evaluating whether a defendant has been deprived of her Sixth Amendment
impartial jury right in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
192
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1978) (“The Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 provides for ‘a trial by jury of not less than six persons,’ . . . but the tribal court is not explicitly prohibited
from excluding non-Indians from the jury even where a non-Indian is being tried.” (citation omitted)).
193
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 73, 77 (“No Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall . . . impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both.”).
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charged with misdemeanors.194 Thus, at the time, the omission of the right to
appointed counsel for indigents did not create a right for tribal court defendants
different from that of state and federal court defendants under the Constitution.
Congress raised ICRA’s sentencing cap in 1986 to one-year incarceration and a
fine of $5,000.195 The next major revisions to ICRA did not come until 2010, when
Congress enacted the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA). This followed coverage of
the danger created by the Indian country criminal jurisdiction gap, especially for
indigenous women.196 TLOA authorized tribal sentences greater than one year, but
not more than three years, for a single offense in two instances—where the defendant
is a repeat offender, or where the conduct would be subject to felony penalties under
state or federal law.197 TLOA also authorized “stacking” individual sentences––i.e.,
imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for multiple offenses to
yield a higher overall sentence to reach a total of nine years of incarceration. 198 Under
194
It is important to note that in 1968, pre-Gideon, many states already provided indigent defendants
counsel at public expense under their own laws and constitutions. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109,
119–22 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (appendix listing thirty-five states then providing appointed
counsel for indigents in all felony cases). Colorado subsequently joined that group of states. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-10-114.5 (West 2020). Further, by 1968, the Court had recognized a Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to counsel in state capital cases and a right to counsel in other felony cases
on a case-by-case basis, but not a categorical Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all felony cases. See
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71–72 (1932); see also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1961)
(holding that arraignment is so critical a stage of Alabama criminal procedure that denial of counsel at
arraignment required reversal of conviction, even though no prejudice was shown); Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455, 473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (holding that the due
process does not obligate the states to furnish counsel in every criminal case). Indeed, Congress considered,
but rejected, imposing an indigent defense requirement in ICRA because it recognized “that tribal
governments simply did not have adequate resources to retain counsel for indigent litigants, and most tribal
courts did not use lawyers but instead provided tribal members for advice as needed.” John R. Wunder, The
Indian Bill of Rights, in THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS, 1968 at 2, 16 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
195
Anti-Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 4217, § 202(a)(7), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-146.
196
Ralph Blumenthal, For Indian Victims of Sexual Assault, a Tangled Legal Path, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
25, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/us/25rape.html [https://perma.cc/J6GX-Q64N]. In 2010,
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study of the Department of Justice’s
prosecution rate in Indian country cases. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-167R, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 1 (2010). The report
was undertaken at the request of Congress following press reports of federal prosecutors declining to
prosecute in a high number of Indian country criminal investigations referred to them. Id. at 1–2. GAO
reported that in fiscal years 2005 through 2009, 10,000 Indian country matters were referred to federal
prosecutors; they disposed of 9,000 of the 10,000 matters by filing for prosecution, declining to prosecute,
or administratively closing the matter; they declined to prosecute fifty percent of the 9,000 cases disposed
of. Id. at 3. About seventy-seven percent of the matters referred involved violent crimes. Id. The GAO found
that declination rates were higher for violent crimes, which were declined fifty-two percent of the time. Id.
197
25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) provides:

A tribal court may subject a defendant to a term of imprisonment greater than 1 year but
not to exceed 3 years for any 1 offense, or a fine greater than $5,000 but not to exceed $15,000,
or both, if the defendant is a person accused of a criminal offense who––(1) has been previously
convicted of the same or a comparable offense by any jurisdiction in the United States; or (2)
is being prosecuted for an offense comparable to an offense that would be punishable by more
than 1 year of imprisonment if prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.
198
Id. § 1302(a)(7)(D). Before TLOA, some tribes were stacking multiple offenses to yield
cumulative sentences over ICRA’s one-year cap. E.g., Romero v. Goodrich, 480 F. App’x 489, 490 (10th
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TLOA, a tribe seeking to assert expanded punishment authority must “opt in” and
provide the following additional procedural protections above those required by the
default provisions in the 1968 version of ICRA:
(1) provide all defendants “the right to effective assistance of counsel at least
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution”; 199
(2) provide indigent defendants, “the assistance of a defense attorney licensed to
practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States that applies appropriate
professional licensing standards and effectively ensures the competence and
professional responsibility of its licensed attorneys” at tribal expense; 200
(3) supply a judge with “sufficient legal training to preside over criminal
proceedings” who is “licensed to practice law”;201
(4) before charging a defendant, make publicly available the tribe’s “criminal
laws (including regulations and interpretative documents), rules of evidence, and
rules of criminal procedure (including rules governing the recusal of judges in
appropriate circumstances)”;202
(5) “maintain a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other
recording of the trial proceeding.”203
These additional protections are only triggered if a tribal court imposes a sentence
greater than one-year incarceration or a $5,000 fine.204 Thus, a tribal court can avoid
TLOA requirements as long as its total sentence of incarceration does not exceed one
year or a fine of $5,000.
Congress amended ICRA again in 2013 as part of the Violence Against Women
Re-Authorization Act.205 The VAWA 2013 amendments to ICRA were enacted in
response to concerns about the federal government’s failure to adequately prosecute
domestic violence crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians living in, or
associated with, Indian communities.206 VAWA 2013 authorized tribes to exercise
Cir. 2012). While TLOA explicitly authorized stacking, it also put an end to unlimited stacking by capping
all sentence lengths at nine years. TLOA’s stacking authorization, therefore, could be viewed as a
limitation on, not an expansion of, tribal sentencing authority. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 417 (2011); see also Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 852 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that pre-TLOA ICRA did not prohibit stacking). But see Spears v. Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1182 (D. Minn. 2005) (“[T]he Court is convinced Congress did
not intend to subject tribal court defendants to many years' imprisonment—without any right to publicly
funded counsel—under the guise of a statute ostensibly extending the benefits of the United States
Constitution. The Court therefore interprets the ICRA's phrase “any one offense” to mean “a single
criminal transaction.”).
199
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1). The default provisions of ICRA provide for the right to assistance of
(retained) counsel; they do not contain an explicit right to effective assistance of counsel because this is a
gloss the Court placed on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel post-1968 in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). See infra note 215.
200
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2). The default provisions of ICRA do not require that counsel be bar-licensed.
201
Id. § 1302(c)(3).
202
Id. § 1302(c)(4).
203
Id. § 1302(c)(5).
204
Id. § 1302(b).
205
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 904, § 204,
127 Stat. 54, 120–23.
206
Cynthia Castillo, Special Feature, Tribal Courts, Non-Indians, and the Right to an Impartial Jury
After the 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2014) (citing
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criminal jurisdiction over some domestic violence offenses committed in Indian
country by some non-Indians for the first time since the Court’s 1978 Oliphant
decision held that tribes lacked inherent sovereign authority to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. This authority is labeled “Special Domestic Violence
Criminal Jurisdiction” or “SDVCJ.”207 VAWA 2013’s SDVCJ provisions authorize
tribes to exercise jurisdiction over domestic violence, dating violence, and violations
of protection orders if the offense involves an Indian victim or an Indian defendant. 208
To fall within SDVCJ, the non-Indian must have some connection to the tribe—such
as working or living in the community; or being married to, or in an intimate or
dating relationship with an Indian who is a member of the tribe, or with a nonmember Indian living in the community. 209 VAWA 2013 explicitly excludes
jurisdiction over crimes in which neither the victim nor the defendant are Indians,
leaving McBratney intact.210
C. An Illusory Procedural Parity
To exercise SDVCJ, tribes must provide criminal defendants all the procedural
protections required under the 1968 version of ICRA,211 and all the protections under
the TLOA amendments to ICRA discussed above. 212 In addition, tribes must provide
VAWA 2013 defendants the right to an “impartial jury,” which Congress defined for
purposes of VAWA 2013 jurisdiction using language the Court developed to define
an impartial jury under the Constitution.213 In case anything was missed, VAWA

under-enforcement of crimes of sexual violence as the impetus for VAWA’s 2013 special domestic
violence jurisdiction over some non-Indians); see also INDIAN L. & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR
MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
18 (Nov. 2013), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/ [https://perma.cc/QVY7-BA6P] (“The Indian Law
and Order Commission has concluded that criminal jurisdiction in Indian country is an indefensible maze
of complex, conflicting, and illogical commands, layered in over decades via congressional policies and
court decisions, and without the consent of Tribal nations.”).
207
25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
208
25 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1)-(2). Proposed amendments to ICRA, which were pending as of the drafting
of this article, would expand tribal jurisdiction over sexual assaults, child abuse co-occurring with
domestic violence, stalking, sex trafficking, and assaults on tribal law enforcement officers. Act to
Reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, H.R. 1585, 116th Cong. § 903 (2019).
209
25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4).
210
Id. § 1304(b)(4)(A)(i).
211
Id. § 1302(a).
212
Id. § 1302(c).
213
Section 1304(d) sets out the “rights of defendants” in VAWA 2013 prosecutions. It provides:
In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction, the participating tribe shall provide to the defendant—
(1) all applicable rights under this Act [i.e., the rights set out in the general provisions of
ICRA found at 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)];
(2) if a term of imprisonment of any length may be imposed, all rights described in section
1302(c) of this title [the TLOA amendments to ICRA];
(3) the right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that—
(A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
(B) do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, including nonIndians; and
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2013 requires tribes to ensure “all other rights whose protection is necessary under
the Constitution . . . in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power
of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction.
. . .”214 In this way, Congress has created a portfolio of rights that non-Indians carry
with them into tribal court entitling them to the full range of procedural protection
they would otherwise, at least theoretically, receive in a state court under the Court’s
incorporation jurisprudence.
ICRA’s TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments create a three-tiered procedural
floor in tribal courts—ICRA’s 1968 provisions require most, but not all, of the
constitutional procedural protections required under the U.S. Constitution as they
existed in 1968.215 TLOA adds law-trained appointed counsel and law-trained judge
requirements. VAWA 2013, aimed specifically at non-Indians now subject to tribal
court jurisdiction for the first time since Oliphant, incorporates the TLOA
requirements, adds an impartial jury right, and requires everything else necessary
under the U.S. Constitution “for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent
power” of tribes exercising SDVCJ.216 ICRA, and its TLOA and VAWA 2013
amendments, on the surface, appear to do no more than harmonize tribal court
procedure with the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence. A closer examination,
however, reveals that Congress has not simply created a tribal court version of state
court incorporation. On the contrary, in some instances, ICRA places more
limitations on tribal courts than the Court places on states under the Fourteenth
Amendment and, in other instances, ICRA provides the VAWA 2013 defendant

(4) all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United
States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating
tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.
214
Id. § 1304(d)(4). It is not entirely clear if this provision tethers ICRA criminal procedure for
non-Indians to the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment state court incorporation jurisprudence, or if it creates
an additional, and potentially larger or narrower body of rights linked to federal court constitutional
criminal procedure. For example, does it incorporate all the selectively incorporated rights as interpreted
by the Court? Or are the Fourteenth Amendment rights different from rights whose protection is necessary
for Congress “to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribal to exercise” VAWA
2013 jurisdiction? Id. It also raises the question of how this provision interacts with retroactivity
doctrines—does it apply to existing “rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution” at the
time VAWA 2013 was enacted, or at the time of a defendant’s crime or sentencing, or at the time the
Court recognizes and interprets them as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment?
215
The timing and history of ICRA’s amendments are critical to understanding its progression. When
Congress enacted ICRA in 1968, some tribal courts assumed they had jurisdiction over anyone, Indian
and non-Indian alike, who violated tribal laws on tribal land. It wasn’t until the Court held otherwise in
1978 that the federal government restricted tribal court jurisdiction based on citizenship. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). It should further be noted that some of the procedural
rights Congress extended with TLOA in 2010 and VAWA in 2013 did not exist in 1968 when Congress
enacted ICRA. As noted above, in 1968 there was no federal constitutional right to counsel for indigents
charged with misdemeanors, and tribal court sentencing authority at the time was limited to misdemeanor
penalties—six-months incarceration and a $500 fine. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 73, 77. In 1968, the Supreme Court had not yet defined the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel as including the right to “effective” assistance of counsel. That came in 1984 under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
216
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4).
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(intended to be non-Indian) more than he would be entitled to in state court under
the Constitution.
Some of these discrepancies can be attributed to nuances in the timing of the
Court’s incorporation jurisprudence vis-à-vis Congress’ legislative enactments. For
example, some procedural rights set out in ICRA’s default provisions were
explained, altered, or refined by the Court in the incorporation context after ICRA
was enacted in 1968 And some aspects of constitutional procedure may not have
been relevant in tribal courts in 1968 because their sentencing authority at the time
was limited to misdemeanor penalties. Some of the discrepancies, however, that give
VAWA 2013 defendants more than TLOA defendants, and sometimes more than
state court defendants, are the result of drafting choices; specifically, the language
dictating the circumstances that trigger VAWA 2013’s additional procedural
protections. VAWA 2013 procedural protections are triggered if a term of
incarceration of any length may be imposed on the defendant as a result of
conviction.217 This is an “authorized incarceration” standard.218 In contrast, in TLOA
prosecutions (limited to Indian defendants), ICRA’s enhanced procedural
protections are triggered when a tribal court actually imposes a sentence greater than
one year. This is an “actual incarceration” standard. 219 As explained in detail in an
earlier article, and discussed below, the distinction between an “actual” sentence and
an “authorized” sentence as a trigger for procedural rights is one of constitutional
significance under the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence, and one that is clearly
delineated in caselaw and commentary. 220 Given this, one can only conclude that
Congress either understood the difference, but deliberately created greater rights for
non-Indian tribal court defendants, or that it was unaware of this well-understood
aspect of constitutional criminal procedure. Whether intentional or inadvertent,
neither explanation reflects well on Congress.
What follows are specific examples of disparities between tribal and state court
federalized criminal procedure that, more often than not, benefit non-Indian
defendants over Indian defendants in tribal court, while sometimes providing
non-Indian tribal court defendants more procedural protections than their state court
counterparts. These disparities are neither technical nor trivial because they demand
resource-intensive procedures and can result in significant public safety and
opportunity costs for tribes.
i. Appointed Counsel
Indigent VAWA 2013 tribal court defendants have a more expansive right to
counsel at public expense than Indian tribal court defendants under TLOA, and than
state court defendants under the Constitution. The starting point for understanding
217

Id. § 1304(d)(2).
Jordan Gross, VAWA 2013’s Right to Appointed Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings—A Rising
Tide That Lifts All Boats or a Procedural Windfall for Non-Indian Defendants?, 67 CASE W. RES.. L.
REV. 379, 386, 428–29 (2016) (explaining the difference between an actual incarceration trigger versus
an authorized incarceration trigger).
219
Id.
220
Id. at 386.
218
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this discrepancy is the familiar “Gideon right,” and the Court’s different application
of the right to appointed counsel in felony and misdemeanor cases.221 Gideon
involved a felony prosecution. It established that state trial courts must provide
indigent felony defendants counsel at public expense under the Sixth Amendment,
as extended to states through Fourteenth Amendment incorporation.222 Under
Gideon, the right to appointed counsel is triggered by the sentence authorized by the
charging statute—a defendant charged with a crime that exposes her to a felony
penalty is categorically entitled to counsel at public expense if she is indigent. 223
Subsequent to Gideon, the Court considered whether the Gideon right extends to
indigent state court defendants charged with misdemeanors.224 In this context, it held
that the indigent misdemeanor defendant is only entitled to counsel at public expense
if the defendant is actually incarcerated for a misdemeanor or receives a suspended
sentence of incarceration, as opposed to being charged under a statute that merely
exposes the defendant to the possibility of incarceration.225 The federal constitutional
right to appointed counsel for misdemeanors, therefore, is not triggered by the
punishment authorized by the charging statute. It is triggered by a trial court’s actual
imposition of a sentence of incarceration or a suspended sentence of incarceration.
In adopting an actual incarceration trigger for the misdemeanor right to counsel, the
Court considered, and rejected, an authorized incarceration standard. And it cited
concerns for state sovereignty and state resource constraints in making this choice.226
As a practical matter, this means a state trial court can avoid the cost of assigning
counsel to indigents charged with misdemeanors by taking jail time off the table at
the outset of a criminal proceeding.
Under the 1968 version of ICRA, indigent defendants have a right to counsel at
their own expense; there is no right to appointed counsel for indigents.227 Thus, under
ICRA’s default provisions, a tribal court can impose a of up to one-year incarceration
on an unrepresented indigent defendant without violating his statutory right to
appointed counsel.228 As noted, ICRA’s default provisions only apply to Indian
defendants. Under TLOA, if a tribal court “imposes” a total term of imprisonment of

221

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
Id. at 339–40, 344.
223
Id. at 344.
224
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657–58 (2002).
225
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 (“[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial.”); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (“[A]ctual imprisonment is a
penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment . . . actual imprisonment [is] the
line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel [for misdemeanors].”).
226
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (holding that any extension of the right “would create confusion and impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States”). Justice Brennan, who joined
the majority in the Argersinger opinion, dissented. In his view, “the economic burden that an ‘authorized
imprisonment’ standard might place on the States. . . . [was] both irrelevant and speculative,” and the
“Court’s role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on
the budgetary decisions of state governments.” Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 601, 82 Stat. 73, 80.
228
This discrepancy has significant downstream consequences for the unrepresented defendant because
uncounseled misdemeanors can be used subsequently as predicate offenses or sentence enhancers as long as
they are valid when entered. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 1–2 (June 13, 2016).
222
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more than one year, it must provide the defendant appointed counsel if he is
indigent.229 By using the verb “imposes,” rather than “may impose,” Congress
created an actual incarceration trigger for TLOA defendants that mirrors the Court’s
Sixth Amendment misdemeanor jurisprudence. But, unlike his state court
counterpart, the TLOA indigent tribal court defendant (which can only be an Indian)
is entitled to appointed counsel only if he receives a felony-length sentence; he is not
entitled to appointed counsel for a misdemeanor-length sentence. In contrast, the
indigent state court defendant is categorically entitled to appointed counsel if he
faces a felony charge, even if he does not actually receive a sentence of incarceration;
and he has a right to appointed counsel if he is sentenced to even one day in jail for
a misdemeanor. A tribal court can forgo appointment of counsel under TLOA, even
if it involves felony charges, as long as it does not actually sentence that defendant
to a term of incarceration over one year. A state court can do this in misdemeanor
cases, but not felony cases.230
VAWA 2013, enacted for the benefit of non-Indian tribal court defendants,
creates a different appointed counsel right. It is greater than that provided for TLOA
defendants, and broader than the Sixth Amendment appointed counsel right. VAWA
2013 requires tribes to provide VAWA 2013 defendants “all rights described in
section 1302(c)”—which includes the TLOA right to appointed counsel for indigent
defendants—“if a term of imprisonment of any length may be imposed[.]”231 The
phrase “may be imposed” is the authorized incarceration trigger the Court explicitly
rejected for state misdemeanor cases out of concern for state sovereignty and fiscal
constraints. And the phrase “any length” erases the misdemeanor/felony distinction
that governs the Sixth Amendment appointed counsel right under the Court’s
incorporation caselaw. Thus, the indigent VAWA 2013 tribal court defendant is
entitled to appointed counsel if the tribal law under which he is charged authorizes
incarceration of any length as a punishment, whether it is categorized as a
misdemeanor or felony, and regardless of whether the defendant actually receives a
sentence that includes incarceration.
ii. Law-Licensed Judges
The default provisions of ICRA do not require that counsel be law-licensed. The
TLOA amendments to ICRA (incorporated by reference into VAWA 2013) specify
that the right to appointed counsel means the right to law-licensed counsel.232 They

229

Tribal Law & Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, sec. 234, § 202(c), 124 Stat. 2258, 2279–80.
Gross, supra note 220, at 422–23.
231
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2) (emphasis added).
232
As discussed above, in 1978 the Court held that the exclusive means to challenge an alleged ICRA
violation by a tribe was through ICRA’s habeas provision, as opposed to through an implied a right of action.
“When resolving these cases, judges commonly took a bifurcated approach. For cases involving provisions
identical to those in the Bill of Rights, courts generally turned to existing federal constitutional law and
procedures.” Developments in the Law – Indian Law, supra note 50, at 1716–17 (citation omitted). Under
this early jurisprudence “[a]ssistance of counsel . . . was determined to require licensed attorneys, even when
a tribe ‘had never allowed professional attorneys to practice in tribal court.’” Id. at 1716 & n.67 (quoting
Michael Reese, The Indian Civil Rights Act: Conflict Between Constitutional Assimilation and Tribal
230
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provide that in TLOA and VAWA 2013 prosecutions, tribes must provide indigent
defendants “the assistance of a defense attorney licensed to practice law by any
jurisdiction in the United States that applies appropriate professional licensing
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of
its licensed attorneys” at tribal expense. 233 ICRA also requires judges presiding in
TLOA and VAWA 2013 cases to have “sufficient legal training to preside over
criminal proceedings” and be “licensed to practice law.”234 The history of
professional licensing and lawyers in tribal court is long and convoluted. Attorneys
were prohibited by federal law from appearing in tribal court until 1961 and
defendants in tribal court had no federal statutory right to counsel until Congress
enacted ICRA in 1968.235 This gave rise to lay advocacy systems in many tribal
courts, overseen through tribal training and licensure requirements. Lay advocates
continue to provide affordable representation in many contemporary tribal courts.236
The history of lay jurists in state and local courts is equally rich, particularly in
rural America communities where, to this day, law-licensed jurists may be few and
far between.237 In many states, courts of limited jurisdiction handle a wide range of
civil and criminal matters.238 These are the busiest courts in the United States, and
they are where most people will interact with a court system. 239 Twenty-two states,
almost half, authorize staffing these courts with justices of the peace or judges who
are not law-licensed attorneys, even in criminal cases240 There is no federal
Self-Determination, 20 SE. POL. REV. 29, 40 (1992)) (“One tribe had instead employed ‘traditional counsel,
such as elders or other tribal members conversant with tribal laws and customs, as representatives.’”).
233
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2).
234
Id. § 1302(c)(3).
235
Creel, supra note 90, at 341 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) (repealed by 26 Fed. Reg. 4360–61
(May 19, 1961))). This federal policy dates back to 1824, when Congress established the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”), which was originally housed in the War Department. Id. at 339. Congress transferred the
BIA to the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) in 1849. Id. In 1883, after Congress transferred the BIA to
the DOI, the DOI created the Courts of Indian Offenses to “establish and impose an adversarial justice
system” in Indian country. Id. In establishing these courts, the DOI created a civil and criminal code and
“mandated the adversary system on the reservation for criminal matters.” Id. at 340. From its inception,
the Courts of Indian Offenses prohibited participation by attorneys to make sure there would be “[n]o
lawyers [to] perplex the judges.” Id.
236
2015 Courses for Lay Advocates and Non-Attorney Prosecutors, CASE IN POINT
(Nat’l Jud. Coll., Reno, Nev.), Sept. 2014, at 33 http://issuu.com/njcmag/docs/case_in_point_2014-2015
[https://perma.cc/HU2N-22NH] (“While there are many ways tribal courts may differ from their state
counterparts, one truly unique aspect of tribal justice systems is the use of lay advocates.”); see also GARROW
& DEER, supra note 72, at 426 (“Because tribal governments have limited resources, they are often unable to
provide defense attorneys for indigent defendants who cannot pay for an attorney. Thus many tribal
governments allow and encourage the use of lay advocates. A lay advocate is a nonlawyer who acts as the
defendant’s counsel. A well-trained advocate can be as effective as an attorney in tribal court.”).
237
George Vecsey, Justice of the Peace: Vanishing Rural American Under Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1971, at 49.
238
Limited Jurisdiction Courts Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS.,
https://www.ncsc.org/limitedjurisdiction [https://perma.cc/GHV9-4FYX].
239
Id. (“Of the 83.2 million cases filed in state trial courts in 2017, an estimated 70 to 75 percent were
of a limited jurisdiction nature.”).
240
Matt Ford, When Your Judge Isn’t A Lawyer, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/when-your-judge-isnt-a-lawyer/515568/
[https://perma.cc/P5UX-57VE] (“Twenty-eight states require all judges presiding over misdemeanor
cases to be lawyers, including large states like California and Florida. In 14 of the remaining 22 states, a
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constitutional prohibition on this practice. Or, stated otherwise, the Court has never
held that a state court defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a
law-licensed jurist.241 Some states limit the practice of using non-lawyer judges to
misdemeanor cases (which likely makes the practice less suspect to federal courts).
But, as noted, the VAWA 2013 provisions of ICRA do not distinguish between
felony and misdemeanor punishments. Thus, tribes must provide a VAWA 2013
defendant charged with any crime for which incarceration of any length is authorized
a bar-licensed judge, something not required of states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
iii. Jury Entitlement, Jury Size, Jury Waiver
ICRA jury rights are perhaps the least coherent provisions of the statute
and the most challenging to un-pack. This is because jury rights are
multi-dimensional—they include jury size, unanimity, waiver, composition (i.e.,
who can be excluded from a jury pool or an actual jury, and where a jury pool must
be drawn from), and the question of what triggers the right to a jury. To complicate
things, the Constitution provides for both civil and criminal jury trials, and it
specifies some of the requirements for those juries, but not others. 242 Further, some
aspects of constitutional jury rights have been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, while others have not. ICRA’s default provisions, and it TLOA,
VAWA 2013 provisions all contain significant and unique variations from each
other, and from federal constitutional requirements. Stated otherwise, the Court has
not fully incorporated all aspects of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury into the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor has Congress aligned ICRA jury rights with each other,
or with the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence.

defendant who receives a jail sentence from a non-lawyer judge has the right to seek a new trial before a
lawyer-judge. But [eight] states—Arizona, Colorado, [Montana,] Nevada, New York, Texas, South
Carolina, and Wyoming—allow non-lawyer judges to hand down jail sentences for misdemeanors without
the right to a new trial before a lawyer-judge. Some states, like Montana, only allow the practice in rural
or sparsely populated counties, while others allow it statewide.”); see also David Carroll, Should
non-lawyer judges be sending people to jail? SCOTUS asked to review, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Dec.
12, 2016), https://sixthamendment.org/should-non-lawyer-judges-be-sending-people-to-jail-scotusasked-to-review/ [https://perma.cc/KG88-ZRP7] (noting that non-lawyer judges are permitted to preside
over misdemeanor or ordinance violation prosecutions to promote “cost efficiency or to facilitate justice
in more rural jurisdictions.”).
241
In North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976), the Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit
trying a defendant who faces incarceration by a non-lawyer judge where the defendant has the right to de
novo review before a judge who is a lawyer. But the Court has not decided whether it is constitutionally
permissible to try a defendant before a non-lawyer judge if there is no right to a de novo trial before a
judge who is a lawyer. The Court recently had the opportunity to decide this issue in Davis v. Montana.
Kate Howard, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2016, 11:14 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/08/petition-of-the-day-975/
[https://perma.cc/QT6Q-HAPW]
(identifying the issue as “[w]hether a criminal defendant charged with an offense punishable by
incarceration is denied due process when he is tried by a non-lawyer judge, where the defendant has no
opportunity for a de novo trial before a judge who is a lawyer.”). It denied certiorari in that case on January
17, 2017. 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017) (Mem.).
242
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
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The Constitution provides for jury trials in civil cases and criminal cases. The
Seventh Amendment requires juries in any suit “where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars.”243 In criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment requires an
“impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed[.]”244 The Sixth Amendment, thus, contains two explicit requirements:
(1) an impartial jury (2) that is drawn from a specific location. 245 The location from
which a jury pool (also “panel”) is drawn is a “vicinage” provision 246 (to be
distinguished from a “venue” provision, which is the location where a trial must be
held). The Sixth Amendment contains a vicinage requirement; the Seventh
Amendment does not. The Court has not incorporated Sixth Amendment’s vicinage
provision into the Fourteenth Amendment. 247 The Court, however, has interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee 248 to prohibit jury selection
procedures that intentionally exclude or single out any “recognizable, distinct class”
from the jury pool.249 And it has interpreted the Sixth Amendment impartial jury
right to require that criminal jury pools be composed of a “fair cross section” of the
community in which a crime is tried.250 Neither the Seventh, nor the Sixth
Amendment, says anything about the size of juries.
243

Id. amend. VII.
Id. amend. VI.
Id.
246
“Vicinage” is defined as “a neighboring or surrounding district.” Its synonyms are: backyard,
neighborhood, purlieus, environs, vicinity. Vicinage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vicinage [https://perma.cc/35LN-L5F3]; 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350 (“Visne” means neighborhood, which, in medieval England, was
interpreted as the county where the act was committed).
247
Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345–46 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (recognizing that right to have
a jury selected from residents of the state and district where the crime occurred does not apply to the
states); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 323,
325–26 (3d Cir. 1980) (same).
248
The Fourteenth Amendment contains an equal protection clause, but it only applies to the states. The
Fifth Amendment, which only applies to the federal government, does not contain an equal protection clause.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, sometimes referred to as “reverse incorporation.” 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
249
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
250
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[T]he selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial” applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). The fair cross section guarantee
is concerned with the composition of the jury pool (also “venire”), not composition of the petit (trial) jury
that will hear the defendant’s case. There is no requirement that a defendant’s petit jury be actually
representative of the community, only that the pool of names from which a court draws a petit jury (or, if
applicable, a grand jury) represent a fair cross-section of the community. United States v. Van Allen, 208
F. Supp. 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, & ORIN
S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.4(d) (4th ed. 2019) (“The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
requires that a petit jury be drawn from a ‘fair cross-section of the community.’ This requirement overlaps
to a substantial extent with equal protection restrictions upon jury selection, but the two guarantees are
distinct. Equal protection prohibits discrimination against a ‘cognizable group,’ while the fair
cross-section requirement prohibits the exclusion of a ‘distinct’ group that leaves the venire less than
reasonably representative. The character of a distinct group for cross-section purposes may be somewhat
different than that of a cognizable group for equal protection purposes. Also, equal protection prohibits
only intentional discrimination, while a fair cross-section objection can reach the systemic
underrepresentation of a distinct group even where there was no intent to underrepresent that group.”
244
245
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ICRA, like the Sixth Amendment, requires speedy and public trials.251 Unlike the
Sixth Amendment, ICRA’s default jury provisions do not include an explicit
“impartial” jury right, or a vicinage requirement. ICRA does, however, require a
six-person jury in cases for offenses punishable by imprisonment. 252 But, unlike the
Sixth or Seventh Amendments, ICRA contains a “default/waiver” provision—that
is, the defendant must affirmatively request a jury, or be deemed to have waived her
right. ICRA’s TLOA amendment does not require additional jury rights over what
the ICRA default provisions provide. ICRA’s VAWA 2013 amendments, however,
added an impartial jury right that tracks the Court’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment jury right by requiring VAWA 2013 jury pools to be drawn from a fair
cross section requirement, using a process that does not systematically exclude any
distinctive group in the community, specifically non-Indians.253 These multiple
variations on the different aspects of state and federal defendants’ constitutional and
tribal court defendants’ jury rights have created some specific and glaring anomalies.
Pertinent to the discussion in this Article, this includes providing VAWA 2013 tribal
court defendants with more expansive jury rights than those they would enjoy in state
or federal court, as discussed below.
The text of the Sixth Amendment requires a jury in “all criminal prosecutions.”254
But the Court has never interpreted the Sixth Amendment to provide a right to a jury
in all criminal cases. Under the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the right to
a criminal jury only attaches in prosecutions for felonies and non-petty
misdemeanors (misdemeanors punishable by six months’ or more incarceration). 255
Unlike the appointed right to counsel, which attaches in misdemeanor cases that
result in an actual or suspended sentence of incarceration, the constitutional right to
a criminal jury is triggered by the authorized penalty of the charging statute.256 The
use of an authorized, as opposed to an actual incarceration trigger, was a deliberate
(citations omitted)); Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair
Cross-Section Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 157–58 (2012)
(citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (“[R]acial groups cannot
be excluded from the venire from which a jury is selected. That constitutional principle was first set forth
not under the Sixth Amendment but under the Equal Protection Clause.”); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,
500 n.9 (1972) (“The principle of the representative jury was first articulated by this Court as a
requirement of equal protection . . . .”).
251
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny
to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
252
Id. § 1302(a)(10) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any
person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not
less than six persons.”).
253
Id. § 1304(d)(3) (“In a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction, the participating tribe shall provide to the defendant . . . (3) the right to a trial
by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that—(A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and
(B) do not systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community, including non-Indians . . . .”).
254
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
255
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968). The length of incarceration is determined by
reference to the charges, considered in insolation, not the aggregate sentence to which a defendant is
exposed if charged with multiple petty misdemeanors. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323–34
(1996) (holding that jury right does not attach even if defendant faces multiple petty offenses in a single
trial if no single charge exposes the defendant to more than six-months’ incarceration).
256
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159.
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choice by the Court. And in making this choice, it expressly considered, and rejected,
importing the right to counsel actual incarceration trigger into its jury right
incorporation jurisprudence.257
As noted, ICRA provides for a jury in all cases involving an offense “punishable
by imprisonment” regardless of length. 258 VAWA 2013 rights are triggered when
incarceration of “any length may be imposed.”259 Thus, in this instance, ICRA
actually provides for a greater right for all defendants than the Court has provided
for state defendants, who are only entitled to a jury if they are facing incarceration
of six months or more.260 In tribal court prosecutions under ICRA’s default
provisions (but not TLOA and VAWA 2013 provisions), however, a defendant must
affirmatively invoke his jury right to trigger it. This is a significant departure from
constitutional criminal procedure under which fundamental rights, like the right to a
jury, are not waived by passive inaction. Constitutional trial rights, with few
exceptions, are personal to the individual defendant and can be waived. But a
defendant will only be said to have given up a fundamental right if she makes a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver on the record.261 Under the default
provisions of ICRA, an Indian defendant is entitled to a jury “upon request.” 262 That
means a defendant’s failure request a jury can waive that right. 263 As noted above,
under the default provisions of ICRA, that same Indian defendant is not entitled to
counsel at tribal expense if charged with a crime that carries a penalty of one year or
less. Thus, the indigent Indian defendant charged with a misdemeanor offense is
expected to invoke her criminal jury trial right without the assistance of counsel. 264
If that defendant is prosecuted, however, for an offense that authorizes a term of
incarceration of any length under VAWA 2013, that defendant (intended to be a
non-Indian) will not waive the right to a jury trial by failing to request one.265
Neither jury size nor unanimity are mentioned in the Sixth or Seventh
Amendments. Federal court practice provides for twelve jurors in all criminal

257

Id. at 160.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10).
259
Id. § 1304(d)(2).
260
Congress is aware of this anomaly, but has yet to correct it. On May 11, 2016, Senators Barrasso
and the late Senator McCain introduced federal legislation to align ICRA jury rights with the Sixth
Amendment. S. 2920, 114th Cong. § 108 (2016) (proposal to amend 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) by inserting
“‘for 180 days or more’ after ‘punishable by imprisonment’” and to amend section 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3)
“in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘the right’ and inserting ‘if a term of imprisonment
of 180 days or more may be imposed, the right’.”). This amendment would put all tribal court defendants
on equal footing with state defendants by making the authorized punishment for a charged crime (i.e.,
anything punishable by imprisonment of six months or more) the trigger for the right to trial by jury. No
action has been taken on this provision.
261
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
262
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10).
263
Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2016).
264
In Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit held that tribal courts have an affirmative obligation to advise
defendants of their jury trial right. Id.
265
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 293, 298 (1930). Which trial rights must be personally
waived by the defendant, and which may be waived on her behalf by an attorney acting as her agent, is a
live issue. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 247–48 (2008). A waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights, however, is never inferred by silence; it must be explicit. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
258
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trials,266 and at least six in civil trials.267 Criminal jury size is one of the few areas in
which states can deviate from federal practice under the Court’s incorporation
jurisdiction. The Court has held that states may conduct felony and non-petty
misdemeanor criminal jury trials with six jurors, and that they can try petty
misdemeanors (i.e., offenses carrying a sentence of up to six months) with no jury at
all.268 As noted, ICRA requires a jury of at least six in all criminal trials for offenses
that carry any term of imprisonment, including petty misdemeanors.269 Thus,
although tribes must provide criminal juries where states are not required to, like
states, they are not required to seat more than six jurors, even in a felony trial. Until
recently, the Court’s case law was not clear on whether state court juries (like federal
court juries) must return unanimous verdicts in criminal cases. After decades of
confusion, the Court clarified that the federal unanimity requirement for criminal
juries is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in Ramos v. Louisiana.270
Following Ramos, although a state may use a six-person jury, it must be unanimous.
iv. Proportionality in Sentencing
ICRA prohibits tribes from “requir[ing] excessive bail, impos[ing] excessive
fines, or inflict[ing] cruel and unusual punishments[.]”271 This language tracks the
Eighth Amendment, which provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required . . .
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 272 The Court interprets the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit certain forms of
punishment (like torture273) and uncommon punishments (like denationalization 274).
On its face, the Eighth Amendment prohibits: (1) excessive fines and (2) cruel and
unusual punishment; it says nothing about excessive punishments. Nonetheless, in a
266
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). A federal court can go below the number of jurors required by Rule 23
with the parties’ consent; a federal court can also proceed with 11 jurors without the parties’ consent in
some instances. Cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229–30, 239 (1978) (recognizing that juries of
twelve in criminal cases were a historical accident and that state courts may have juries of six for criminal
cases, but that juries of five persons posed issues of constitutionality).
267
FED. R. CIV. P. 48; Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973).
268
Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968).
269
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10).
270
No. 18-5924, slip op. at 4 (Apr. 20, 2020).
271
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A).
272
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
273
“[I]t is generally agreed that the Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibits certain kinds of . . .
punishments . . . in modern American society [such as] drawing and quartering[.]”). RONALD J. ALLEN,
JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, & TRACEY L. MEARES, C RIMINAL
PROCEDURE : ADJUDICATION AND R IGHT TO C OUNSEL 1487 (3rd ed. 2020).
274
In Trop v. Dulles, the Court found that revoking a criminal’s citizenship as punishment for an
offense constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment because denationalization results in “the total
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.” 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). An Indian country
application of this principle can be found in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874,
895 (2d Cir. 1996). In Poodry, tribal members who were banished from their tribe’s land and disenrolled
as tribal members argued that disenrollment was equivalent to denaturalization, and, therefore, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under ICRA. Id. at 879. The Second Circuit declined to rule on whether
banishment is cruel and unusual punishment under ICRA, but subsequent federal courts have rejected the
argument that disenrollment proceedings equate to “punishment” under ICRA cruel or unusual
punishments prohibition. E.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2010).
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very narrow range of cases, the Court has found that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause includes a proportionality requirement prohibiting punishments
that are excessively disproportionate to the offense committed. Under this
proportionality doctrine, the Court has found execution disproportionate for any
crime short of reckless or deliberate homicide, 275 for adult defendants with
intellectual disabilities276 and for juvenile offenders.277 Most recently, the Court
extended the doctrine to mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles. 278
Outside of adult capital cases and juvenile capital and life without parole sentences,
the Court has never encountered a state court sentence it considered constitutionally
disproportionate to the offense of conviction.279 This includes a mandatory sentence
of life without possibility of parole for a first-time adult felony drug offense. 280 Thus,
under the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Constitution places no
proportionality constraints on the length or severity of non-capital, non-juvenile state
court sentences.
In contrast, ICRA identifies and quantifies excessive punishment when imposed
by a tribe, regardless of the crime committed or the procedural and due process
protections afforded a defendant. As discussed, Congress limits tribes’ punishment
authority under the default provisions in ICRA to one-year incarceration and a
$5,000 fine.281 It limits tribes’ punishment authority in TLOA prosecutions to
three-years’ incarceration and a $15,000 fine for a single offense, and nine years for

275
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death penalty disproportionate for rape
of adult); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1987) (holding that death penalty disproportionate for
felony murder unless defendant acted with at least reckless disregard for human life); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008) (holding that death penalty disproportionate for rape of child).
276
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
277
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
278
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
279
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1006–07 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment). The Court routinely upholds state choices in sentencing in the name of federalism and respect
for state sovereignty. Contrast this with the federal government’s approach to imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed in Indian country. The U.S. government recently resumed federal
executions, one of which was an Indian convicted for an offense committed in Indian country. This is over
the objection of the community and the tribal government and notwithstanding provisions in the Federal
Death Penalty Act, which purports to allow tribes to opt out of the federal death penalty for its citizens.
Felicia Fonseca, Most American Indian tribes opt out of federal death penalty, AP NEWS (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://apnews.com/86b9734f456846e9b0df9faa0237122f/Most-American-Indian-tribes-opt-out-offederal-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/2EFU-RDZY]; see also Christie Thompson, The Navajo Nation
Opposed His Execution. The U.S. Plans to Do It Anyway, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/09/17/the-navajo-nation-opposed-his-execution-the-u-s-plansto-do-it-anyway [https://perma.cc/W5UB-YQG6] (explaining the judicial and political process
leading to Lezmond Mitchell’s execution); Christopher Scragg, Court upholds death penalty for
only Native American on U.S. death row, CRONKITE NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2020/04/30/court-upholds-death-penalty-for-only-native-american-on-us-death-row/ [https://perma.cc/R5MR-5NUY] (explaining that the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of Mitchell’s
appeal and upholding his sentence).
280
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994–96. In contrast with the length and severity of sentences of
incarceration, the Court has shown much more interest in limiting states’ criminal fines under the Eighth
Amendment’s excessive fines prohibition, which is explicit in the text of that amendment. Timbs v.
Indiana, No. 17-091, slip op. at 2 (Feb. 20, 2019).
281
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B).
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stacked offenses.282 Thus, for any offense or combination of offenses under any
circumstances committed in Indian country over which a tribe has jurisdiction, even
a depraved crime of violence, Congress has defined a tribal sentence over nine years’
imprisonment and $15,000 in fines as “excessive” as a matter of law. 283 In contrast,
under the Major Crimes Act and PL 280, federal law allows the federal and state
governments practically unfettered authority in punishing identical crimes that fall
under those sovereigns’ Indian country jurisdiction. 284
v. Habeas Corpus
The federal writ of habeas corpus was originally only available to challenge
detention by federal authorities.285 Federal distrust of post-Reconstruction southern
justice led Congress to extend federal court review to state court convictions.286
Congress undertook a major revision of the federal statutory scheme governing
federal court review of state and federal court criminal convictions in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 287 AEDPA greatly
circumscribed federal court review of state court convictions by: (1) establishing a
one year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition, 288 (2) authorizing
federal courts to deny claims on the merits that a petitioner fails to exhaust in state
court,289 (3) prohibiting federal courts from holding an evidentiary hearing if a
282

Id. § 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D).
See id.
284
This matters because Indian defendants fare particularly poorly in federal courts, receiving higher
sentences and representing a disproportionate number of federal defendants. Droske, supra note 73, at
724. One of the few limitations on federal courts’ sentencing authority over Indian defendant/Indian
country sentencing is a provision in the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3598, that allows
individual tribes to elect whether their citizens can be sentenced to death by the federal government for
violations of the Major Crimes Act, Id. § 1153, or the Federal Enclaves (General Crimes) Act, Id. § 1152.
Only one tribe, the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma, has opted into the federal death penalty for its
citizens for crimes committed in Indian country. Fonseca, supra note 279. This option does not extend to
tribes in PL 280 states, which cannot opt out of state death penalty laws. Id.
285
Jurisdiction: Habeas Corpus, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdictionhabeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/GLD3-ERSK].
286
Michael C. Dorf, A Unanimous Supreme Court Ruling Underscores the Limits of Habeas Corpus as a
Remedy for State Prisoners, VERDICT (May 22, 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/05/22/a-unanimoussupreme-court-ruling-underscores-the-limits-of-habeas-corpus-as-a-remedy-for-state-prisoners
[https://perma.cc/MM55-LQ59] (following the Civil War, “[f]earful that the states of the former Confederacy
would undermine federal rights—especially the rights of the freedmen and their allies—during Reconstruction,
Congress expanded the writ, permitting challenges to state detention as well.”).
287
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 104, §
2254(b)(2), 110 Stat. 1214, 1218.
288
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”). Section 2244(d)(2) set out
tolling periods, and section 2244(d)(1) provides for four possible starting dates for the limitation period.
289
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 166 (“The new statute preserves the requirement of exhaustion of
state remedies [contained in the earlier federal habeas statute], but two significant innovations [were]
introduced. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the
failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the state. In addition, a state shall
not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the
requirement unless the state, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.” (citations omitted)); see
also 25 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (recognizing that petitioner can avoid exhaustion only if there is no available
283
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petitioner fails to develop facts in state court, except in limited circumstances, 290 (4)
barring successive petitions, except in limited circumstances, 291 and (5) imposing a
new standard for federal court review of state court determinations of fact and
applications of federal constitutional law. 292 AEDPA also requires a certificate of
appealability from a court of review before a petitioner may appeal from a district
court’s denial of habeas relief.293
The modern federal statutory habeas scheme for state prisoners is lengthy and
complex. This is by design. Congress has placed multiple barriers in the path of state
prisoners seeking to challenge their convictions in federal court on federal
constitutional grounds to ensure that state courts have the final say in most state court
criminal cases, even on questions of federal constitutional law. The most formidable
barrier Congress erected is AEDPA’s highly deferential federal standard of review.
That standard asks not whether the state court erred in applying federal law, but
whether the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an objectively
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the
Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.294 The intent of
these revisions was to limit the reach of the writ and codify the process federal courts
are required to follow in reviewing state and federal prisoner habeas petitions. 295
Contemporary federal courts’ limited authority over state prisoners’ claims reflects
Congress’ recognition of states as separate sovereigns with primary authority over,
and a superior interest in, resolving challenges to state court convictions.296
state remedy or the remedy is ineffective to protect the petitioner’s rights. If there is no state remedy
because of a procedural default, federal review is still prohibited).
290
25 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). AEDPA carried over a statutory presumption in the earlier version of the
habeas statute requiring federal courts to treat state court fact-findings as presumptively correct unless
rebutted by the petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary
Hearings Under the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 137–38 (1996).
291
AEDPA limits the number of times a prisoner may ask for a writ. A successive habeas petition
may not be filed in the federal district court unless authorized by a three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals. 25 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
292
Id. § 2254(d).
293
Id. § 2253(c); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 166 (“A state prisoner wishing to appeal
the denial of habeas corpus had previously been required to obtain a certificate of probable cause. This is
now called a certificate of appealability. It may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right and it must indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy that
requirement.” (citation omitted)).
294
25 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”).
295
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 166 (“Congress made many important changes in habeas corpus
in 1996. . . . The changes made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about
habeas corpus and the drafting in the new statute has been criticized. The changes restrict habeas corpus
but they do not virtually eliminate it, as some critics would have preferred.” (citations omitted)).
296
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 103 (2011)) (“The limited scope of federal review of a state petitioner’s habeas claims . . . is grounded
in fundamental notions of state sovereignty.”) Because “[f]ederal habeas review of state convictions
frustrates both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights[,]” section 2254(d) is “designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum
for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103 (quoting
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ICRA provides for federal court habeas review of tribal court convictions.297 It is
the exclusive avenue available to litigants to obtain federal court review of alleged
violations of ICRA by tribal government actors.298 ICRA’s habeas provision is one
sentence long: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention299 by order
of an Indian tribe.”300 Unlike AEDPA, ICRA contains no statutory time limitations
on ICRA habeas provision, and no substantive limitations on federal review of tribal
court convictions.301 Federal courts have developed common law habeas doctrines
that purport to extend deference to tribal court dispositions of criminal cases. 302 But
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555–56 (1998)). But see Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity,
Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 507 (2007) (“Whatever the role for perceived
congressional purposes in statutory interpretation, courts—as faithful interpreters of legal texts—may
legitimately rely on that perception only to the extent that it is accurate. Based on what we know about
AEDPA, the 104th Congress had no interpretively meaningful purposes beyond the words it ratified. . . .
‘Comity, finality, and federalism’ is now the favored idiom for erroneously invoking a legislative mood;
it has become the means by which courts express an illegitimate hostility towards exacting standards of
criminal procedure.”).
297
25 U.S.C. § 1303 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in
a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.”); Bressi v.
Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the exclusive means to enforce ICRA’s civil
rights protections in federal court is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus under section
1303—“except for habeas corpus challenges, any private right of action under [the Indian Civil Rights]
Act lies only in tribal court.”).
298
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (ICRA does not provide any remedy for
violations of its rights other than habeas corpus). Santa Clara Pueblo was handed down right after
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), which, as discussed infra, held that tribes could
not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless expressly authorized by Congress.
299
ICRA uses the term “detention,” whereas federal habeas law refers to “custody.” ICRA “detention”
requirement has been constructed to be analogous to the “in custody requirement” under federal habeas
statutes, but there is a circuit dispute on this point. Compare Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 890–91 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We find the choice of language unremarkable . . . . Congress
appears to use the terms ‘detention’ and ‘custody’ interchangeably in the habeas context.”), with Tavares
v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We view Congress’s choice of ‘detention’ rather
than ‘custody’ in § 1303 as a meaningful restriction on the scope of habeas jurisdiction under the ICRA.”);
see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The Need for More Exacting Assessment of the Individual Rights and
Sovereign Interests at Stake in Federal Court Interpretation of “Detention” Under the Indian Civil Rights
Act’s Remedy of Habeas Corpus, 14 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 63, 101–02 (2019) (identifying the circuit split
in defining these terms).
300
25 U.S.C. § 1303.
301
Developments in the Law – Indian Law, supra note 50, at 1719–20 (“The federal courts acceded
to the Supreme Court’s determination that no independent federal cause of action exists in ICRA. The
question that has remained before the courts is how much deference to show to tribes in interpreting ICRA.
Some federal courts have rejected differences of culture as a reason for adjusting habeas review, while
others have maintained a practice of deference (at least in part) to tribal interpretations. Those courts that
have not deferred have used federal precedents and definitions of rights to inform the meaning of ICRA.”
(citations omitted)); see also id. at 1719 n.91 (citing Poodry, 85 F.3d at 900–01) (“[T]here is simply no
room in our constitutional order for the definition of basic rights on the basis of cultural affiliations, even
with respect to those communities whose distinctive ‘sovereignty’ our country has long recognized and
sustained.”); id. at 1719 n.92 (citing Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[R]esolution
of statutory issues under the ICRA will ‘frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom
which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts.’”) (citation omitted)).
302
For example, all federal courts that have addressed the issue, at minimum, require tribal court
petitioners to establish that they are “in custody” and that they have exhausted their tribal remedies. FELIX
S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.09; see also Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751, 756
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those limitations have come from the federal courts, not Congress, and are, therefore,
subject to revisions, modifications, and inconsistent application. 303
Lest there be any doubt about Congress’ discomfort with the prospect of tribal
courts rendering judgment on non-Indians unchecked by federal court supervision,
it should be noted that VAWA 2013 includes a habeas stay of detention provision. 304
Under that provision, a VAWA 2013 tribal prisoner who is challenging a sentence
of incarceration can ask the federal court who will hear the petition to stay the tribal
court order of detention pending federal habeas review. 305 The federal court must
grant a stay if it finds a “substantial likelihood that the habeas corpus petition will be
granted”;306 and, after notice to alleged victims, if it finds, by clear and convincing
evidence that “the petitioner is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or
the community if released.”307 The ICRA stay of detention provision appears to be
much more generous than that available to state prisoners in federal court308 and it
does not appear to extend to non-VAWA 2013 prisoners.309
III. A FALSE AND FAILED ANALOGY
It is hard to argue with the premise of the Court’s excursion into state court
criminal procedure—to foreclose the use of the criminal justice system to perpetuate
state-sponsored injustice and discrimination against racial minorities. Recognizing
that, in the context of federalism, unchecked deference to local autonomy and state
sovereignty too often translates into tolerating oppression of racial and political
minorities by the majority, the Court created a new body of race law through its
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation jurisprudence. In doing so, it subordinated
local autonomy interests to the greater federal interest in protecting the minority from
(9th Cir. 2009) (“We therefore have no jurisdiction to hear a petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus, unless
both [exhaustion and the in custody] conditions are met.”).
303
See Seielstad, supra note 299, at 101–03.
304
25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(1).
305
Id.
306
Id. § 1304(e)(2)(A).
307
Id. This mirrors the federal bail statute, which requires release pretrial on conditions unless the
court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant poses a risk of flight or a danger
to the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
308
A state prisoner challenging a conviction in federal court can request to be released on bail pursuant
to FED. R. APP. P. 23(b)–(c). To be released pending a decision on the merits, a petitioner must show a
substantial claim of law based on the facts and “some circumstance making [the motion for bail] exceptional
and deserving of special treatment in the interests of justice.” Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Aronson v. May, 85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (Douglas, J., in chambers)). “There will be few occasions
where a prisoner will meet this standard.” Id. Because a habeas petitioner “is appealing a presumptively valid
state conviction . . . it will indeed be the very unusual case where a habeas petitioner is admitted to bail prior
to a decision on the merits in the habeas case.” Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993).
309
Carrie E. Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal and Tribal Courts: A Search for Individualized
Justice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 137, 152–53 (2015) (The concept of citizenship as a “‘limiting
principle on tribal powers’ . . . is found again in the VAWA amendments to ICRA that allow non-Indians to
seek a stay of detention when filing a habeas petition. Indians do not receive this same protection. The federal
government perceives their right to vote as enough protection against civil rights violations by tribal
governments. Fearful of civil rights violations, the government affords non-Indians to use their U.S.
citizenship as a cloak and request a stay of detention while their federal habeas petition is pending.” (quoting
N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 22 –23 (Colin G. Calloway ed., 2008))).
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the majority. Absent a similar federal interest, requiring tribes to assimilate to federal
constitutional criminal procedure is neither a necessary nor obvious proposition in a
federal system.310 Contemporary Indians in Indian country are not similarly-situated
to racial and ethnic minorities outside tribal lands.311 Unlike racial and ethnic
minorities excluded from a political process, tribal members in Indian country are
both the governors and the governed. The animating force behind the Court’s
incorporation doctrine—protecting individual minority interests from the majority—
is a poor fit for modern federal Indian country policy. Nonetheless, this is the
backbone of ICRA.312
Further, the concept of protecting an individual from his own community may be
particularly ill-suited to any justice norm that does not assign primacy to the
individual over the collective. “Sovereignty,” in contemporary Western use typically
refers to a community’s authority to make decisions in a given geographic region
with the end of protecting and promoting the rights of individuals. 313 This notion is
deeply grounded in a Western tradition that posits “a dichotomy between individuals
and the ‘state’ or ‘nation.’”314 It is a concept that may not fit with some “indigenous
understandings of the relationship between individuals and their encompassing
cultural and political structures . . . .”315 It is also a curious choice given colonists’
objection to having an external power’s rules of criminal procedure forced on them
and used as a tool of social and political control. The concerns colonists had
regarding misuse of criminal procedures like venue and jury rights were so strong
that they were highlighted in the Declaration of Independence and addressed twice

310
Skibine, supra note 136, at 189–90 (noting that there “is a difference between political
incorporation and constitutional incorporation” and positing that “tribes [can] be ‘incorporated’ into the
United States federalist system without being totally assimilated into the federal structure. In other words,
tribes could be incorporated into the federal system under a third sphere of sovereignty that would allow
them to keep their distinctiveness. Indian tribes have already been, at least partially, politically
incorporated into the United States. . . . [through] Supreme Court decisions as well as cumulative
legislation . . . such as the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975.” (citations omitted)).
311
Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as a Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1798 (2019) (“National constitutional rights have long been used as a tool to further the colonial project
against Native peoples – first as a tool of dispossession during the allotment era and more recently as a means
to undermine tribal sovereignty by using the force of national rights to disrupt the power of tribal
governments. Instead, the national government has best protected Native peoples by bestowing power, not
rights, through the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty. Contrary to the tenets of ‘[our] father’s
federalism,’ localism has empowered Native Nations through the ability to self-govern.” (citations omitted)).
312
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1978) (“We note at the outset that a central
purpose of the ICRA . . . was to ‘secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitutional rights afforded
to other Americans,’ and thereby to ‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal
governments.’” (citations omitted)).
313
Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural
Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 198 (2001)
(observing that “[t]he most pernicious aspect of this debate [over indigenous self-determination] is that
indigenous peoples’ collective existence continues to be framed by Western notions of sovereignty and
self-determination.”).
314
Id. at 197.
315
Id. at 198.
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in the Constitution.316 The 2010 TLOA and VAWA 2013 amendments exemplify,
confirm, and perpetuate the presumption of incompetence Congress and the federal
courts have historically extended to tribal justice. Demanding even more conformity
to colonialist procedural norms as a pre-condition to exercising more sovereignty can
only be explained by Congressional assumptions either that: (1) there are no
structures in individual tribal communities capable of addressing wrongdoing and
disputes, or (2) if there are, the results they produce will not sufficiently (or perhaps
consistently) align with mainstream norms of justice to be accorded legitimacy. In
the case of VAWA 2013, Congress has undertaken to protect non-Indians from the
threat of facing an “unfamiliar” justice, rather than protect non-Indians as a group
from an identifiable threat to their civil liberties. What is missing to justify Congress’
approach is a documented history of misuse and subversion of the tribal legal system
to oppress a politically disempowered non-Indian minority.317 In this way, ICRA is
based on a false analogy.
ICRA is also based on a failed analogy. Although Congress did not track the Bill
of Rights precisely in ICRA, there is no question it intended to set a procedural floor
for tribal court defendants as the Court has done for states.318 And it is apparent that
Congress intended VAWA 2013 provisions to ensure that non-Indian defendants
subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction would not be procedurally disadvantaged by
316
Article III requires that “the Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed[,]” and the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amend. VI. In THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U.S. 1776), the colonists complained that the crown had
transported them “beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences,” i.e., removed defendants from the
colonies to be tried in distant locations under laws external to the community by unknown jurors. This is
not unlike the federal government’s practice of removing Indian defendants from Indian country under
Major Crimes Act jurisdiction to try them for wrongdoing in Indian country under federal law in federal
district courts, none of which sit in Indian country, and all of which are geographically and culturally far
removed from the defendants’ community. Like colonists removed to Great Britain to stand trial, Indian
defendants in federal court are almost certain to be judged by a jury with no Indians on it. Kevin K.
Washburn, The Federal Criminal Justice System in Indian Country and the Legacy of Colonialism, FED.
LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 40, 41.
317
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 2019 TRIBAL CONSULTATION
REPORT 46 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/1271686/download [https://perma.cc/P4CBQTUA] [hereinafter TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT] (summarizing testimony from Glen Gobin, Vice
Chair, Tulalip Tribes: “Currently, it seems like non-Native perpetrators have more protections than
victims of crime. To move toward a legislative fix for this issue, tribes are expected to provide
justification. The fact that tribal people are being hurt and perpetrators are not being held accountable
should be sufficient justification. . . . The federal government needs to enhance tribal capacity to protect
tribal people, not limit that capacity with onerous requirements and penalties. Tribal systems are often
treated as inferior to those of other jurisdictions. Just because a non-Native offender is tried in another
jurisdiction does not mean they will receive unfair treatment. Tribes want the same thing as other
jurisdictions: to be able to protect their people.”).
318
ICRA, “rather than providing in wholesale fashion for the extension of constitutional requirements
to tribal governments, as had been initially proposed, selectively incorporated and in some instances
modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of
tribal governments.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1978) (citation omitted). Thus,
in ICRA, “Congress accorded a range of procedural safeguards to tribal-court defendants ‘similar, but not
identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.’” United States v.
Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016) (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 57).
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being tried in tribal court, rather than a state or federal court. TLOA and VAWA
2013 affirm or restore some tribes’ authority to prosecute and punish some crimes
committed in Indian country. But they also perpetuate federal colonization of tribal
justice by requiring tribes that wish to participate in these statutory schemes to
conform even more closely to the federal constitutional criminal procedure code.319
Currently, therefore, although there is a fair amount of diversity among tribal justice
systems “in concept and character,”320 a high level of conformity to colonialist
procedural norms in criminal cases is demanded from tribes that seek to assert their
sovereign authority to treat wrongdoing as more than a misdemeanor or exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. By demanding more of tribes than the Court
requires of the states, and linking the exercise of additional power to tribes’
acquiescence to colonialist norms, Congress has imposed a procedural surcharge on
tribes’ exercise of their inherent sovereignty. 321 By tethering ICRA to the Court’s
incorporation jurisprudence Congress has also, in my view, missed an opportunity to
fashion a more flexible approach that leaves space for tribes to employ practices and
procedures that reflect their individual community’s justice norms, traditions, and
aspirations.322

319
TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 317, at 26 (summarizing testimony of Arnold Garcia,
Lieutenant Governor, Nambé Pueblo on TLOA and VAWA 2013 procedural trade-off: “Some tribes do
not plan to exercise SDVCJ over non-tribal offenders because implementation requires tribes to change
their traditional court systems to mirror state courts. Asking tribes to change the way they settle disputes
so that they can reclaim jurisdiction over non-Indians is very disrespectful.”).
320
Tribal Courts, supra note 40 (describing some tribal courts as “extensively elaborate,” while
“others are just beginning to develop a ‘Western’ judicial system within the context of their individual
nations[,]” and noting that “[s]ome tribes prefer the adversarial process, while others emphasize traditional
dispute resolution. Many courts apply large bodies of written or positive law and others apply custom and
tradition to address controversy and settle disputes.”); see also Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice
Systems and Tribal Society, in JUSTICE AS HEALING : INDIGENOUS WAYS 108, 109, 112 (Wanda D.
McCaslin ed., 2005), http://www.aidainc.net/Publications/ij_systems.htm [https://perma.cc/YF9GKS8M] (providing details about the diversity of tribal justice systems).
321
Developments in the Law – Indian Law, supra note 50, at 1726–27 (“Respecting and reinforcing
tribal culture and norms not only acknowledges tribal sovereignty but also promotes good governance.
For years, tribes have been told by others how to run their governments and have reaped few benefits. But
when tribes have a government and laws that match their culture, ‘the odds of success for tribal
development increase.’ Tribes and their citizens tend to view such governments as more legitimate, and
these governments in turn bring economic returns to the tribes. Moreover, a ‘cultural match’ approach, in
which tribes are permitted to have differing interpretations of rights, avoids the ‘one-size-fits-all
mentality’ that characterized much of the federal relationship with tribes in the past. The diversity of tribal
approaches to governance and citizenship should not be eclipsed by federal precedents developed using
an outside culture and context, especially when such an effort would likely harm tribes’ long-term
prospects.” (citations omitted)).
322
See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227–28 (2011) (“The
first, and perhaps the worst, error Warren’s Court made was . . . to tie the law of criminal procedure to the
federal Bill of Rights instead of using that body of law to advance some coherent vision of fair and equal
criminal justice.”); see also George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process
and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170 (2005) (criticizing doctrines that allow
innocence to go ignored). See generally DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2003) (suggesting
that a turn to due process and equal protection doctrine could benefit the criminal justice system).
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In the United States today, American-Indian and Alaska Native women are
victimized at a rate more than twice that of women of other ethnicities. 323 This
violence occurs primarily at the hands of non-Indians, who make up a substantial
majority of the residents of Indian country nationwide. 324 Congress’ limitations on
tribes’ jurisdiction and punishment authority over non-Indians represents more than
a restraint of sovereignty antithetical to local autonomy principles in criminal law. 325
It is bad public policy with immediate, practical implications for tribes’ ability to
promote public safety in their communities.326 The power to impose a sentence is not
simply the power to incarcerate a defendant. It includes the coercive power to impose
non-carceral sanctions, such as a term of probation imposing conditions tailored to
addressing underlying factors that may contribute to an offender’s conduct. This
includes ordering participation in therapy or treatment programs to address substance
abuse disorders or parenting deficiencies. Particularly with respect to intimate and
family member violence, offenders and their victims are likely to have experienced,
witnessed or been exposed to trauma, on an individual level and on an
inter-generational level.327 ICRA’s sentencing cap constrains the length of sanctions
323

A 2016 study by the National Institute of Justice found that more than four in five American Indian
and Alaska Native women (84.3%) have experienced violence in their lifetime. This includes 56.1% who
have experienced sexual violence, 55.5% who have experienced physical violence by an intimate partner,
48.8% who have experienced stalking, and 66.4% who have experienced psychological aggression by an
intimate partner. The study also found “American Indian and Alaska Native women are 1.2 times as likely
as non-Hispanic white-only women to have experienced violence in their lifetime and 1.7 times as likely
to have experienced violence in the past year[,]” and further found that American Indian and Alaska
Native men also have high victimization rates. Rosay, supra note 14, at 1–2 & tbl.1 (citation omitted).
324
Id. at 4. (“The majority of American Indian and Alaska Native victims have experienced violence
at the hands of at least one interracial perpetrator in their lifetime—97 percent of female victims and 90
percent of male victims. Fewer American Indian and Alaska Native victims have experienced intraracial
violence in their lifetime—35 percent of female victims and 33 percent of male victims. The study found
similar results for all types of lifetime and past-year experiences.”). According to the 2010 U.S. Census,
out of the total 4.6 million people living in American Indian areas, seventy-seven percent did not identify
as American Indian or Alaska Native. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 14 (2012), https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/c2010br-10-112019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BQR8-MNCJ].
325
Washburn, supra note 316, at 41 (“[T]he basic theory of the purpose of federal prosecutions is
turned on its head on Indian reservations. Because federal Indian country jurisdiction is defined
geographically, routine local offenses—such as homicides, sex offenses, assaults, robberies, and
burglaries, all of which are serious but have few effects outside the locality—become federal, not because
of any national or international nexus, but precisely because of the locality in which they occur. The
federal justice system thus derogates from the basic norm that local crime should be addressed locally.”).
326
E.g., Mary Hudetz, Amid a crime wave on Yakama Reservation, confusion over a checkerboard of
jurisdictions, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020, 9:49 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/times-watchdog/amid-a-crime-wave-on-yakama-reservation-confusion-over-a-checkerboard-ofjurisdictions/ [https://perma.cc/8SH7-LU8A].
327
E.g., TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 317, at 8–9 (summarizing testimony of Daphne
Joe, Wellness Coordinator, Authorized Designee, Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council explaining the role of
historical trauma in Indian communities: “The federal government must understand the history of violence
against women in Alaska Native villages. Traditionally, Alaska Native cultures are based on respect and
did not tolerate abuse. However, federal termination policies damaged this way of life. In my
grandparents’ generation, our homes were invaded, our relatives died from new diseases, and we were
punished for speaking our language and living our way of life. People turned to alcohol to mourn these
changes. We are still healing from the historical trauma. We must provide shelter for women and children
and education for the perpetrators. Federal programs that provide funding to tribes must be based in tribal
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a tribal court can order as a condition of probation and, in this way, limits the
timeframe in which tribes can encourage and, if necessary, compel, defendants to
participate in programs or treatment . In the domestic violence context, outside of
VAWA 2013 jurisdiction, tribes cannot compel any non-Indian to access resources
that might make the non-Indian’s family safer and more functional. In this context,
tribes must either rely on the state courts, or invoke their authority to exclude the
wrongdoers from the reservation, neither of which may be in the best interests of
their community.328 This is especially true where a non-Indian defendant is a parent
or partner of a tribal member and when keeping a family intact, or at least nearby,
while providing for the victim’s safety and the perpetrator’s treatment, is the
community’s objective.
The requirements TLOA and VAWA 2013 place on tribes that wish to access
expanded sentencing and restored jurisdiction—specifically, providing law-licensed
appointed counsel and judges, and creating deeper jury pools—are resourceintensive.329 As a result, Congress has effectively limited the restoration of local
autonomy over wrongdoing in Indian country to tribes that are financially and
logistically able to implement the additional criminal procedures required by TLOA
and VAWA 2013.330 In doing so, Congress has placed a price tag on sovereignty and
created two classes of tribes—those with sufficient resources to meet the
requirements necessary to access restored authority, and those without—sovereignty
haves and have-nots.331 While the federal government does make funding available
ways of life and must support who we are, rather than change who we are.”); id. at 15 (summarizing
testimony of Emily Kameroff, Emmonak Tribal Council member on the need for funding to support
offender rehabilitation: “The village needs culturally relevant rehabilitation programs to help people heal,
especially repeat offenders. Our people often return to jail for the same crimes, and nothing is done to heal
their broken spirits, so they return to the village feeling resentful. Often, they cannot find work and turn
to alcohol and drugs.”). The two tribes represented above are Alaska Native Villages, which were
excluded from VAWA 2013 participation.
328
Traditionally, Indian tribes have used banishment rarely and for serious crimes only, and as a “last
resort after exhausting customary and traditional methods of social discipline and sanction.” Patrice H.
Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV.
85, 92 (2007). Some tribes, however, left with no options under the current federal jurisdictional
scheme have resorted to more a robust use of banishment to protect community safety. Renee
Ruble, Banishment Laws Revived Among Indians, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/25/banishment-laws-revived-amongindians/68626da3-64a2-434d-9c1d-de8822648a94/ [https://perma.cc/5CT6-DNCL].
329
Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34
IDAHO L. REV. 465, 511 (1998) (“Although federal courts appear not to have been presented with the
issue, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights heard complaints from tribal officials that jury trials present
insurmountable practical and financial problems for tribal courts.”).
330
TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 317, at 17 (summarizing testimony of Carletta
Tilousi, Tribal Council Member, and written comments from Muriel Coochwytewa, Chairwoman,
Havasupai Tribe: “The Havasupai Tribe is an awardee of OVW [Office on Violence Against Women]
funding. OVW asks tribes to change their government structures and protocols to receive funding. To
meet the grant requirements, our tribe secured a licensed judge and prosecutor, created an appellate court,
and updated the law and order code. These requirements are a burden on tribal governments, whose
resources are already stretched very thinly.”).
331
Melodie Edwards, Native American Tribes Want To Close Loopholes In Violence Against Women
Act, NPR (June 25, 2018, 5:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/623318932/native-american-tribeswant-to-close-loopholes-in-violence-against-women-act [https://perma.cc/QA73-R672] (“adopting the
Violence Against Women Act hasn’t been easy or cheap. It’s involved hiring more attorneys and judges
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to support tribes in exercising TLOA and VAWA 2013 jurisdiction, this funding is
neither guaranteed, nor always timely provided. Further, this funding is primarily
grant-based, which excludes tribes lacking grant-writing resources or expertise.332
This
pay-to-participate scheme leaves residents of poorer tribal communities limited
options for addressing violence in their communities by Indians, and no options
whatsoever for holding non-Indians accountable for wrongdoing under their laws.333
The TLOA and VAWA 2013 law-license requirements for appointed counsel and
judges are not only costly, they are pernicious from a self-determination perspective.
It is an open question whether TLOA requires judges and lawyers to have a law
license from a state jurisdiction and to hold a J.D. from a law school, or whether a
tribal court license is sufficient.334 To the extent TLOA requires a state license, this
ensures that advocates and jurists in tribal court will be familiar with, if not
indoctrinated in, colonialist, adversarial justice norms. As noted, historically and
contemporaneously, many tribes have relied on lay advocates to deliver legal
assistance to indigent defendants. And lay advocacy evolved in Indian country
because, at one point, attorneys were barred from appearing in Indian country courts
by federal law. It is not the case that poor criminal defendants in tribal court were
going at it on their own before Congress enacted TLOA. But it is the case that
requiring law-licensed attorneys for TLOA and VAWA 2013 creates a barrier and a
disincentive to charging serious offenses as felonies and to the prosecution of nonand paying for more prison beds. Those high costs have discouraged many tribes from signing
on. Only a fraction of the country’s tribes have adopted it.”); see also Mary Hudetz,
Despite past reforms, Native women face high rates of crime, AP NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://apnews.com/316529000f3c44988969ab22acfb34d7/Despite-past-reforms,-Native-women-facehigh-rates-of-crime [https://perma.cc/9RK9-UMAV] (stating that the 2013 Violence Against Women Act
“gave tribal authorities the ability to prosecute non-Indians in domestic violence cases. However, only 18
tribes have met the mandates to do so, the National Congress of American Indians reported in March.
Those mandates include requiring tribes to provide an attorney to suspects who cannot afford one—a
costly ask for cash-strapped nations. ‘We can’t guarantee that because we don’t have the funding to
guarantee it,’ said Robert LaFountain, a prosecutor on Montana’s Crow Reservation, where the per capita
annual income of roughly $15,000 is about half the national average.”).
332
TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 317, at 5 (summarizing testimony of Michael
Williams, Council Secretary and Treasurer, Akiak Native Community: “Tribes must compete against one
another for DOJ and HHS funding. In the end, only tribes with grant writers can successfully apply for
funding, while under-resourced tribes go without. Tribes that do receive awards cannot rely on continuity
of the funding. As a result, many successful tribal programs fail after the grant cycle ends. Funding is
extremely limited for rehabilitation and treatment, which are essential components of public safety and
crime reduction.”).
333
See id. at 30 (summarizing testimony of Mary Jane Miles, Vice Chairman, Nez Perce Tribe: “The
portions of VAWA designed to help tribes do not necessarily align with tribal needs. It seems they were
not written by someone who understood tribal communities.”).
334
TLOA requires that tribes provide indigent defendants “assistance of a defense attorney licensed
to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States that applies appropriate professional licensing
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its licensed attorneys.”
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2). It also requires that judges presiding over TLOA criminal proceedings have
“sufficient legal training to preside over criminal proceedings” and be “licensed to practice law by any
jurisdiction in the United States.” Id. § 1302(c)(3). Section 1302(c)(3) does not repeat the requirement
that the license be issued by a jurisdiction that “applies appropriate professional licensing standards and
effectively ensures the competence and professional responsibility . . . .” Id. § 1302(c)(2). This is probably
because many states regulate judges separately from licensed attorneys.
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Indians by making those prosecutions more expensive. It is ironic that, at the same
time states are recognizing that the lawyers’ monopoly on legal services has
encumbered Americans’ access to justice and are experimenting with loosening
requirements over the practice of law, 335 Congress has pushed tribes away from lay
advocacy by requiring appointment of law-licensed attorneys as a pre-condition to
exercising TLOA and VAWA 2013 authority. This is particularly short-sighted
given the difficulty that poor, rural jurisdictions (which describes many Indian
reservations) face in recruiting and retaining professionals, such as doctors and
lawyers, to serve their communities.336
ICRA ostensibly reflects the principles of tribal self-government and cultural
autonomy.337 But TLOA and VAWA 2013 link the outer reach of tribes’ criminal
jurisdiction—the power to vindicate violations of its laws in their individual
communities—under federal law to tribes’ willingness and ability to provide specific
colonialist procedural protections to defendants in their courts. 338 And they link the
exercise of sovereignty to a Western carceral approach to addressing sexual and
physical violence.339 Participating in TLOA and VAWA 2013 are optional, of
course, and tribes are free to develop their own internal forums and practices for
addressing acts of violence in their communities, such as diversion programs or
wellness courts. The rub, of course, is that tribes cannot compel non-Indians to
participate in alternative justice forums unless they can invoke VAWA 2013 criminal
jurisdiction. Many tribes situated within the United States are faced with a public
safety crisis of overwhelming proportions. But tribes cannot fully protect their
communities unless they agree to adopt and pay for criminal court procedures that
may not be aligned with their own justice traditions and, as such, may not reflect the
community’s best option for protecting its residents. 340 The circumstances under
which Congress is extracting tribal participation in TLOA and VAWA 2013, while
nominally optional, are inherently and extraordinarily coercive.
As of the drafting of this Article, Congress is considering re-authorizing and
expanding VAWA’s Indian country jurisdiction provisions to allow tribes to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians in a wider class of crimes attendant to domestic
335
See Mary Juetten, The limited license legal technician is the way of the future of law, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 8, 2017,
8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_limited_license_legal_technician_story_start_with_why
[https://perma.cc/8UMN-C23P].
336
Grant Gerlock, With Attorney Shortage, Rural Areas In Search Of Lawyers, KCUR (Dec. 12, 2016,
4:16 AM), https://www.kcur.org/agriculture/2016-12-12/with-attorney-shortage-rural-areas-in-searchof-lawyers [https://perma.cc/J8LM-BDK4].
337
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (citing S. REP. NO. 841, at 5–6 (1967)).
338
Fletcher, supra note 35, at 117 (“There may always be a fundamental conflict between mainstream
values of the melting pot and the measured separatism of Indian tribes, but assimilating Indian tribes into the
American legal culture may be a significant step toward destroying tribal cultures within the United States.”).
339
Sarah Deer, Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis of Safety and Sovereignty,
WICAZO SA REV., Fall 2009, at 149, 163 (connecting the fight against sexual violence against Native
women to the struggle for Native sovereignty, and questioning the efficacy of colonial adversarial and
tribal restorative justice approaches in responding to the issue).
340
For another perspective on this point, see Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian
Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564 (2016), which discusses concerns with imposing constitutional norms
on Indian tribes, but concludes that tribes can absorb some federal constitutional mandates without
jeopardizing their distinctiveness.
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violence incidents.341 The justifications for further expansion of VAWA jurisdiction
over non-Indians is that the public safety crisis in Indian country has not abated since
TLOA and VAWA 2013 were enacted. If anything, this indicates that Congress has
not moved fast or far enough in restoring tribal sovereignty over wrongdoing in
Indian country in such a way that empowers and enables tribes to effectively protect
their communities. It also suggests that TLOA and VAWA 2013 are more likely to
undermine public safety in Indian country than to promote it in the long run. 342
Low-resourced tribes face the same, if not more acute, public safety challenges
as better-resourced tribes. And rural tribes do not have the same opportunity as tribes
located near urban areas to take advantage of partnerships with law schools and local
bar associations to expand their capacity to provide legal representation to indigents
and training for lawyers and judges. 343 Thus, although poorer, rural tribes may face
similar or greater public safety challenges than others,344 they are the least likely to
be able to participate in TLOA and VAWA 2013 because of the challenges in
implementing and paying for the procedures required by those statutes. Replicating
the Court’s federalization of state court criminal procedure (and in some instances,
outdoing it) is more likely to replicate the justice and innovation gap that currently
exists among states following the Court’s federalization of state court criminal
procedure. More to the point, creating a structure that only allows tribes with
resources to opt-in to greater prosecution and punishment powers does nothing to
close the jurisdictional void created by federal Indian country policies in poor or
remote reservation communities.
341

See Act to Reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, H.R. 1585, 116th Cong. (2019).
Hudetz, supra note 331 (analyzing that years after Congress gave tribes authority under TLOA
2010 to “hand down longer sentences while mandating that federal officials do more to train tribal police
on evidence collection and provide an annual report on Indian Country crime statistics. . . . [t]hose data
collection and reporting efforts are still in development, funding for law enforcement training remains
limited, and the Justice Department’s assistance with public safety on reservations—a role referenced in
multiple treaties with tribes—has fallen short of officials’ expressed commitment to Indian Country,
according to the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General. . . . [T]he Inspector General also
highlighted U.S. attorneys’ uneven track record with prosecuting serious violent crimes on reservations,
citing data that must be collected under the 2010 law to help improve those prosecution rates. Before the
law, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found [sic], U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute half of
cases on reservations, leading to concerns that the practice was creating a safe haven for criminals on
tribal lands. The latest figures from 2016 show U.S. attorneys declined to prosecute 46 percent of
reservation cases, marking only marginal improvement. That included rejecting more than 550 assault and
sexual assault cases—more than any other type of crime.”).
343
The Tulalip Tribes, for example, were among the first tribes to opt-into VAWA 2013 jurisdiction.
The Tulalip Reservation is located next to a major interstate roughly 40 miles north of Seattle, and they
operate a number of highly successful commercial enterprises, including a Resort Casino and a premium
outlet mall. TULALIP VISITOR’S GUIDE 2020-2021 (Tulalip Tribes, Tulalip, Wash.), June 2020, at 3–4, 8,
10,
https://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/Content/Documents/Tulalip-Visitors-Guide/brochure.html#p=4
[https://perma.cc/UHU5-6BE5].
Even before the Tulalip Tribes opted-in to VAWA 2013, they had partnered with the University of
Washington School of Law to provide indigent defense services. A Road to Recovery, UNIV. OF WASH. (Nov.
2018), https://www.washington.edu/boundless/tribal-healing-court/ [https://perma.cc/BK96-ARV2].
344
Although crimes rates in the U.S. have decreased generally, they have increased in rural America.
Alan Greenblatt, In Rural America, Violent Crime Reaches Highest Level in a Decade, GOVERNING
(July 2018), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-crime-rural-urban-cities.html
[https://perma.cc/394R-MRQ5].
342
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IV. CONCLUSION
The federal legal scheme within which tribal justice systems are situated in the
United States is historically overtly hostile to indigenous justice. Current federal
policy incentivizes abandonment of indigenous justice practices and encourages
tribes to further shape their justice processes on colonialist norms if they want to
reassert sovereign powers usurped by the national government. The displacement
and suppression of indigenous justice within the U.S. federal system has been
extensive. But it is neither an inevitable feature of post-colonial federalism, nor is it
irreversible.345 Geographic-based jurisdiction and local autonomy are the norm in
Anglo-European legal systems.346 And local innovation in law enforcement and
criminal justice is held up as a value in the U.S. federal system. Congress could go a
long way to addressing the public safety crisis in Indian country by embracing these
principles in its Indian country policy, as the Court has in its modern relations with
the states. One place to start is to deregulate tribal court criminal jurisdiction and
procedure completely and restore tribes’ plenary authority over wrongdoing in
Indian country.347 Short of that, Congress should, at a minimum, amend ICRA to fix
345
While Congress has been encouraging tribes to further westernize their court procedure, many
colonialist court systems, presumably dissatisfied with Western adversarial justice approaches, have
incorporated traditional indigenous concepts into their colonialist adjudication models. For example, some
mainstream courts in Canada and the United States have looked to indigenous justice traditions to account
for the different experiences of indigenous persons in colonialist criminal justice systems. These include
Canada’s specialized federal sentencing procedures for indigenous offenders and specialized courts for
indigenous defendants in some U.S. local court systems. Wayne K. Gorman, The Sentencing of Indigenous
Offenders in Canada, 54 CT. REV. 52, 52 (2018), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr54-2/CR542Gorman.pdf [https://perma.cc/FSD6-CNM8]; see also Urban Native American Healing to Wellness
Court, N.M. CTS., https://metro.nmcourts.gov/urban-native-american-healing-to-wellness-court-.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VZV5-JFXM] (describing Bernalillo County, New Mexico’s Metropolitan Court Urban
Native American Healing to Wellness Court).
346
Rollin M. Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 1155 (1971)
(describing four foundations of criminal jurisdiction—territorial jurisdiction, Roman jurisdiction, injured
forum, and cosmopolitan jurisdiction, and explaining that, under the territorial theory, criminal
jurisdiction depends on where a crime occurs. In contrast, under Roman theory, jurisdiction is based on
the identity of the perpetrator); see also Kevin K. Washburn, Tribute, American Indians Crime and The
Law: Five Years of Scholarship on Criminal Justice in Indian Country, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1014
(2008) (“The first value, not discussed often, but implicit in much of the structure of our criminal justice
system, is localism—the notion that criminal justice should be handled locally, especially for local crimes.
. . . In Indian country, however, local crimes are federalized. Serious offenses, such as aggravated assaults,
sex offenses, homicides, and cases involving juveniles, are prosecuted federally. These cases are almost
entirely local offenses with local harms. Many of them are disputes within very small communities . . . .
Absent the Indian country location of these offenses, almost all of them would be prosecuted locally.”).
347
Skibine, supra note 136, at 195 (summarizing the more important arguments supporting legislation
reconfirming tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers: “(1) The implicit divestiture doctrine as interpreted by
the Court is demeaning to Indian tribes in that it treats them as second rate or lesser governments . . .
[which] has resulted in a loss of respect towards tribal governments. (2) Lack of tribal jurisdiction over
non-members has jeopardized the ability of tribal governments to enforce the law on reservations. This
has resulted in the inability of tribes to protect their members and other significant tribal interests. (3)
Because federal and state courts do not have jurisdiction over all cases arising on the reservations, the lack
of tribal jurisdiction has resulted in . . . ‘lawlessness.’ (4) Congress needs to reassert its constitutionally
assigned role in regulating the relations between members and nonmembers.” (citations omitted)); see
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the incorporation imbalance described here that results in greater procedural rights
for the non-Indian tribal court defendant at an added cost to tribal governments.
The Court has recognized that procedures like providing law-licensed lawyers
and judges, and assembling criminal juries burden states’ sovereignty interests and
undermine the principal of local autonomy in criminal justice matters. The Court has
thus declined to impose blanket federal mandates for appointed counsel,
law-licensed judges, and juries in all criminal cases. Instead, it has carved out a
misdemeanor/felony divide for the right to appointed counsel and for the right to a
jury trial, and it has not required state judges to be licensed lawyers. Whether
justifiable or not, the Court’s felony/misdemeanor distinction reflects a recognition
that
across-the-board federal procedural mandates create extraordinary financial burdens
for state and local government because misdemeanor cases constitute the bulk of
criminal prosecutions in the United States. Requiring states to adopt
resource-intensive procedures, thus, inevitably requires them to redirect resources
from other state-funded programs and priorities. Ultimately, this limits states’
options and introduces ground-level cost-avoidance incentives in the investigation
and prosecution of crime. This dynamic is no different for tribes. By demanding more
of tribes when they prosecute non-Indians than what the Court has deemed necessary
to ensure fairness in state criminal prosecutions, Congress directly and
disproportionately burdens tribes’ exercise of their inherent sovereignty. Further,
making the prosecution of non-Indians more expensive than that of other defendants
can compromise community safety by introducing a cost-avoidance incentive into
tribes’ VAWA 2013 charging and prosecution decisions. There are valid arguments
why the national government may have an interest in setting a procedural baseline
for tribal courts as it has done for the states. But there is no sound justification in law
or policy for requiring tribes to provide more procedural protections to non-Indian
defendants than they would be entitled to in state court under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

also TRIBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 317, at 30–31 (summarizing testimony of Nancy Smit,
Tribal Secretary, Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi Tribe: “Non-Native people commit the
majority of crimes against AI/AN people, and tribal governments have no power to regulate these people
and crimes within much of the checkerboarded land. While SDVCJ [VAWA 2013’s Special Domestic
Violence Criminal Jurisdiction] was a step toward restoring tribes’ authority to protect their communities
from outside threats, it falls short of reaffirming the authority that the Oliphant decision took away from
tribes. For example, it does not cover . . . crimes that typically co-occur with intimate partner violence,
such as crimes against children and police officers and drug and alcohol offenses. In the event of crimes
against children, the tribal police can do nothing beyond removing the perpetrator from the reservation. It
defies logic that a tribal government may prosecute a non-Native offender for violence against a romantic
partner, but is forced to stand idly by if the perpetrator commits the same acts of violence against a child.
. . . The Oliphant decision stripped tribal nations of their sovereignty and dignity, rendering tribes almost
completely dependent on the federal government to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives on tribal
lands. . . . With proper funding and jurisdiction, most tribes are capable of prosecuting crimes that occur
within their territory.”).
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